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ROYCE DE R. BARONDES
Fiduciary Duties in Distressed Corporations:
Second-Generation Issues
ABSTRACT
This Article examines variations in corporate fiduciary duties arising from financial
distress. This Article argues whether there is an affirmatively enforceable duty
under the principles of Credit Lyonnais is not moot, because, inter alia, the availa-
bility of aiding and abetting liability for breach of fiduciary duty will give rise to a
greater set of potentially liable defendants (aiding and abetting a fraudulent trans-
fer typically not separately giving rise to liability), allowing a court to reverse some
outcomes that would otherwise obtain under the in pari delicto doctrine and the
Wagoner rule, and will expand the remedies available.
This Article proposes that the application of the business judgment rule to direc-
tors' operation of a distressed firm should be, if anything, stronger than the corre-
sponding provision applied to a solvent firm. The rationale is a contrary right
would create an anomalous option for creditors having expressly negotiated ap-
proval rights-one that would be difficult to value and that would create greater
costs of investigation in order to avoid being a "winner" in a contest presenting a
winner's curse.
This Article also examines the interplay of corporate distress with approval of
conflict of interest and final period transactions. It concludes that during distress
short of insolvency, fiduciary duties to maximize firm value on a sale should con-
tinue to be owed to stockholders and approval of conflict-of-interest transactions
by disinterested stockholders should continue to shift the burden of proof as to a
transaction's fairness.
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Lastly, this Article, following Malone v. Brincat, argues for an increase in the duty
of candor during distress regarding communications to creditors. Financial credi-
tors consider information a debtor provides in deciding whether to exercise con-
tractually negotiated control rights. Creditors should be entitled to rely on
truthfulness even if the debtor is unaware of a particular action the creditor may
take in reliance. As proposed, a creditor would not need to prove a distressed
debtor made a statement for purposes of influencing the creditor's conduct because
financial creditors may be presumed to be deciding whether to exercise remedies on
an ongoing basis. Other elements of a cause of action, including whether a defen-
dant failed to exercise the appropriate care in assuring the accuracy of the state-
ment, would remain unchanged.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THIS ARTICLE SEEKS TO PROVIDE INSIGHTS INTO PROPERLY framing the contours of
the fiduciary duties owed by those managing solvent corporations operating in the
vicinity of insolvency. In a majority of jurisdictions (according to the count of
others), courts shift fiduciary duties to creditors upon a corporation's insolvency.'
The decision spawning over a decade's worth of scholarship on the subject is the
Delaware Chancery Court's opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe
Communications Corp.2
This Article examines the interstices of a number of areas of law. Normal state
principles governing fraudulent conveyances and transfers' and federal bankruptcy
law bear on the issue. In addition, other corporation law provisions, for example,
Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; and Senior Fellow, Contracting
and Organizations Research Institute (CORI); I.D., University of Virginia; S.B. & S.M., Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. The author would like to thank Wilson Freyermuth for comments and Megan Pittman for
research and editorial assistance. This article was presented on November 4, 2005, at the conference Twilight in
the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and Creditors of Troubled Companies hosted by the University of
Maryland School of Law and reflects developments as of that time.
1. Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d 901,
904-05 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Thus, the 'majority rule' permits recovery by creditors of an insolvent corporation for
mismanagement as if the corporation itself were plaintiff, while the 'minority rule' precludes suit by injured
creditors of an insolvent corporation, although a suit for misappropriation or diversion of corporate property
may stand on different and more solid footing.") (citations and footnote omitted). The support for this princi-
ple is not unanimous. See, e.g., Helm Fin. Corp. v. MNVA R.R., Inc., 212 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000)
("Even assuming for purposes of analysis that the distribution of [a wholly owned subsidiary's] stock [to the
debtor's stockholders] left [the debtor] nearly or actually insolvent, or that defendants knew, or reasonably
should have known, that insolvency was likely to occur as a result of the distribution, no breach of fiduciary
duty occurred because defendants did not treat themselves to a preference over [a judgment creditor of the
debtor] and other creditors." ). Assorted authority is collected in Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of
Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 63 n.54 (1998), and a more recent
collection is provided in WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 5.2.6.3 (1996 & Supp.
2002).
2. No. Civ. A. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
3. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 6-273 (1999); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT,
7A U.L.A. 274-365 (1999). The principles also may interact with each other. See generally Kittay v. All. Bank of
N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 465 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Allegations that an insolvent
corporation made a fraudulent transfer state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty . . ").
VOL. 1 NO. 2 2007
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN DISTRESSED CORPORATIONS
the limit on corporate distributions to shareholders4 and principles regulating dis-
positions of firms,' may apply.
The law of fiduciary duties applied to distressed corporations should be a com-
prehensive whole, consistent both internally and externally with other principles
such as federal and state laws governing debtor-creditor relations. A wealth of au-
thority, in case-law and academic commentary, is potentially pertinent. The pur-
pose of this Article is to assemble some of the components of that whole, without
describing the full multifield context of the academic discussion of the issues, pro-
viding a comprehensive solution, or cataloguing the full range of variation among
jurisdictions from Delaware corporation law.
Others may assert that none of these duties should be imposed by law, but in-
stead governed by express contracting between the parties. That appears to be a
hyper-abstract approach to analyzing efficiency-hyper-abstract meaning the analy-
sis evidences a level of economic abstraction that has, in abstraction, omitted perti-
nent nuance-producing questionable conclusions. Two reasons immediately come
to mind.
First, this hyper-abstract view focuses on the long-term without adequately ad-
dressing the short-term and the intermediate-term consequences. Many debtor-
creditor relationships that present these issues are long-term relationships. Their
duration may be thirty years or more, perhaps representing more than a generation
in case-law development of the pertinent fiduciary duties. Simply relegating all this
to express contract does not address how the law should treat relationships already
formed under contracts that cannot practicably be renegotiated at this time, for
example, long-term, publicly traded debt. Appropriate resolution of these cases is
needed and should not be sacrificed for purposes of developing a mechanism to
address temporally distant disputes.
Second, some of the subjects of these duties may be difficult to negotiate. The
debtor-creditor relationships that some assert should be simply governed by ex-
press contract would, one supposes, be voluntary transactions, not debtor-creditor
relationships arising from tort claims. Some matters may be sufficiently sensitive
4. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170, 174 (2001 & Supp. 2004); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (2005).
Compare Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 456, 460 (1lth Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing state limit on corporate payment of dividends and stock repurchases under GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-91
(1988), and GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-154(a)(1)-(2) (1982), applied to consideration received by stockholders
of firm acquired in reverse triangular merger); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 510-12
(N.D. 111. 1988) (denying motion to dismiss claim that distribution unlawful under 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
8.65(a)(1), 9.10(c)(1) (1983), was affected by a leveraged buyout structured as a tender offer for all the target's
stock in which substantially all the target's assets were pledged to finance the loan funding the tender offer),
with C-T of Va., Inc. v. Barrett (In re C-T of Va., Inc.), 958 F.2d 606, 612-14 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding amounts
received by stockholders of firm acquired in reverse triangular merger had not received distributions subject to
the limit on dividends provided by Virginia corporation law, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-653(C) (1989)).
5. See infra Part V (discussing fairness of conflict-of-interest transactions and Revlon duties).
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that, in the ordinary case, it taints the process of forming the mutual trust required
to enter into a business relationship to raise them.6
For example, one of the fiduciary duties owed by those managing a corporation,
at least a Delaware corporation, is a duty of candor.7 Although my personal recol-
lection of practice is limited by both the fact that I engaged in private transactional
practice for only a limited amount of time and that the experiences I had in prac-
tice are now somewhat shrouded in my memory by the passage of time, I cannot
recall a circumstance in which opposing counsel expressly urged that his client be
permitted to make affirmative misstatements to me or my client. Indeed, a review
of asset purchase agreements in the Contracting and Organizations Research Insti-
tute (CORI) database' confirms that, at least in that sample of contracts, parties do
not negotiate contract provisions allowing one party to "lie."9
It is perhaps common for parties to provide for a similar result by negotiating
contract provisions stating that one party has not relied on certain information or
that a warranty arising from any statement is disclaimed.'" But that only serves to
further the point. If it were not difficult to discuss issues relating to a contracting
party's freedom to lie, it would be stated more directly, or at least stating it directly
would occur occasionally where the other formulations seem not to work
consistently."
A normal justification for the hypothetical-bargain standard of contract law 2 is
that it provides off-the-rack rules mimicking what the parties would have bar-
6. Although not in the area of debtor-creditor law, Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App.
1976) (waiver of affirmative marital obligations), rev'd in part. 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976) (reversing as to
"whether the earning capacity of an unemployed, divorced wife bars her from alimony absent a compelling
reason which prevents her from accepting employment"), superseded by statute, 1979 La. Acts 72, as recognized
in Arrendell v. Arrendell, 390 So. 2d 927, 929 (La. Ct. App. 1980), raises expressly negotiated issues that, one
supposes, generally would not be the subject of an express ex ante agreement, although there might be some
general implicit expectations in that regard.
7. See infra Part V.3.
8. CORI: Contracting and Organizations Research Institute, http://www.cori.missouri.edu (last visited
Oct. 17, 2006).
9. A search of all the 866 asset purchase agreements currently in the database for the words lie, lied, and
lies disclosed only four agreements. Each used the word in some other way, e.g., as to whether a subsequent
lawsuit would "lie" in a particular a particular location. E.g., Asset Purchase Agreement by and among SRS
California Operations LLC, Noble Logistic Services, Inc. (CA), Noble Logistic Services, Inc. (MI), and Noble
International, Ltd. at 32 (March 24, 2003).
10. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (construing contract stating, inter alia, "'Except for the representations and warranties contained in this
Article III, neither the Sellers nor any other Person make any express or implied representation or warranty on
behalf of or with respect to the Sellers, the Business or the Purchased Assets, and the Sellers hereby disclaim any
representation or warranty not contained in this Article III.").
11. See id. at 417 (noting that the effectiveness of disclaimers of reliance on misrepresentations is influ-
enced by whether the disclaimer "tracks the substance of the alleged misrepresentation... ") (citation omitted).
12. E.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1815-16 (1991) ("To interpret contracts, lawyers ask: what would the parties have agreed
to had they explicitly adverted to the issue? That is, the interpreter constructs a 'hypothetical bargain': he
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gained for without the associated cost. 3 A separate justification is that the process
of reaching the bargain may alter the relationship between the parties and perhaps
prevent formation of contracts that would be beneficial were the default rule prop-
erly selected. Raising some issues in negotiation, such as whether one party is free
to lie as long as the lie is not made in anticipation of reliance, 4 simply may inhibit
formation of mutual trust required necessary to form some contracts.
In sum, this Article reaches the following conclusions:
" The existence of an affirmatively enforceable duty under the principles of
Credit Lyonnais is not moot, because, inter alia, the existence of aiding and
abetting liability"s for breach of fiduciary duty will give rise to a greater set
of potentially liable defendants, and increase the remedies otherwise availa-
ble where the duties contemplated by Credit Lyonnais are not affirmatively
enforceable (aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer typically not sepa-
rately giving rise to liability). Whether there is a fiduciary duty running
directly to the creditors is important because in the absence of direct obliga-
tions, the prior participation of management in the transaction may pre-
vent assertion by the trustee of an aiding and abetting claim. 6
" The application of the business judgment rule to directors' operations of
distressed firms should be, if anything, stronger than the corresponding pro-
visions as applied to solvent firms, because a contrary right would create an
anomalous option for creditors having expressly negotiated approval rights.
Similarly, the current trend finding charter provisions limiting liability to
creditors or trustees for breaches of fiduciary duties of care is desirable.
" The determination of the time horizon for which corporations are managed
should continue to be delegated to management, notwithstanding distress.
" During distress short of bankruptcy proceedings, fiduciary duties to maxi-
mize firm value on a sale should continue to be owed to stockholders. Ap-
proval of conflict-of-interest transactions by disinterested stockholders
should continue to shift the burden of proof as to the fairness of the
transaction.
determines how the parties would have bargained to treat the situation that has arisen had it been directly
presented to them at the time they were forming the contract.").
13. E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
34 (1991) ("Why not just abolish corporate law and let people negotiate whatever contracts they please? The
short but not entirely satisfactory answer is that corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that
participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting. Corporate law--and in particular the fiduci-
ary principle enforced by courts-fills in the blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have
bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.").
14. Reliance is an element of the tort of misrepresentation. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
15. Aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer typically does not separately give rise to liability.
16. See, e.g., Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (In re Mediators, Inc.), 105 F.3d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1997).
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" During distress, the obligation of candor under Malone v. Brincat'7 should
appertain to communications with creditors, thereby creating a duty not to
make affirmative misstatements, regardless of whether the communication
is in connection with approval of a particular action by the creditors. Fi-
nancial creditors will consider the information provided in connection with
deciding whether to exercise contractually negotiated control rights, and
they should be entitled to rely on truthfulness even if the debtor is not aware
of a particular action the creditor may take in reliance.
" In disputes with a trustee or creditors, principles of implicit ratification of
an officer or director having taken a corporate opportunity should be en-
hanced. The clearest case for allowing creditors to bring an action for breach
of corporate opportunity obligations involves opportunities in which the di-
rector or officer will be competing with the distressed debtor.
Before turning to the analysis, it is helpful to make one final remark concerning
the scope of this Article. This Article will not emphasize the difference between
obligations that give rise to direct claims and those that can be asserted only deriva-
tively. Litigation of the corresponding duties to creditors will frequently be raised
in bankruptcy-a trustee may be bringing the claims if the creditors cannot di-
rectly-so that procedural obstacles to pursuing these claims in solvent corpora-
tions lose their force.' This Article, for ease of exposition and because the typical
procedural obstacles will not apply in the context of litigation of these issues in
bankruptcy, may refer to stockholders as beneficiaries of fiduciary duties in con-
texts where a claim for breach can be brought only derivatively. 9 Of course,
whether a claim may be brought only in a representative capacity is a separate
question from whether there is a duty owed to a specific nonstockholder
constituency. 2°
17. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
18. Understanding which claims can be brought may become more complex where a lawsuit is initiated by
the creditors in the name of a trustee, as illustrated in Ranalli v. Ferrari (In re Unifi Commc'ns, Inc.), 317 B.R.
13 (D. Mass. 2004). See generally Alan R. Lepene & Sean A. Gordon, The Case for Derivative Standing in
Chapter 11: "It's the Plain Meaning, Stupid," 11 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 313 (2003).
19. See generally Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & lenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004) (restating the
distinction between direct and derivative claims).
20. For example, Delaware law provides that for willful or negligent payments of unlawful dividends,
directors have joint and several liability"to the corporation, and to its creditors in the event of its dissolution or
insolvency." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174(a) (2005). Drexler et al. indicate that the current law is that "this
provision .. .prevent[s] a single creditor from bringing an action at law against a director to recover illegal
dividends." DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE § 20.06, (2005) (describing
this as the outcome in John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Mode, 43 A. 480 (Del. Super. 1899) and stating that a
statutory revision following John A. Roebling's Sons Co. was superseded by a 1937 statutory revision reinstating
the outcome in John A. Roebling's Sons Co.).
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II. THE ISSUE IS NOT MOOT
1. Different Scope of Persons Potentially Liable
In Credit Lyonnais, the court stated:
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board
of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty
to the corporate enterprise.
* . . [In managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicin-
ity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient
and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice
that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group
interested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.
... [T]he [issuer] board or its executive committee had an obligation to the
community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in
an informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-term wealth
creating capacity.2
In that case, the "duty," if it can be called that,22 to non-shareholder constituen-
cies was used in a defensive context-to defend the propriety of action by those
managing the corporation against a claim that an improper constituency's interests
were being promoted.23 An initial question is whether the contemplated duty gives
rise to affirmatively enforceable obligations, a matter that has been previously ex-
21. Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108-09 & n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
22. The uncertainty in terminology arises from ambiguity in whether there is a duty affirmatively enforce-
able by creditors.
23. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *5, *106 (discussing a claim that a member of a
distressed firm's executive committee breached a fiduciary duty owed a controlling stockholder by delaying
sales of firm assets). See generally Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 420 (Del. Ch. 1999)
("Moreover, in arguing that the defendant directors' failure to file for bankruptcy law protection was a violation
of the board's fiduciary duties to the stockholders, plaintiffs overlook that the board was obligated to consider
and protect interests other than those of the stockholders. When bankruptcy and foreclosure are compared,
and the effects of both on the shareholders, creditors and other corporate constituencies balanced, the decision
to proceed with the foreclosure cannot be said to have been made in bad faith or a manner that was disloyal to
ABCO, taken as a whole.").
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amined by courts, which have expressed varying conclusions,24 and discussed by
commentators."
A threshold question in assessing the significance of case law finding an enforce-
able duty owed to creditors of firms operating in the vicinity of insolvency is
whether it makes any difference at all. If the remedies this theory makes available
merely duplicate remedies available under other principles, the matter merits little
discussion. The issue is not, in fact, moot. One illustration26 involves aiding and
abetting liability for breach of fiduciary duty, which expands upon the liability
regime otherwise available in two ways. As developed below, the availability of a
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty changes the nature of the remedy available and
adds potentially liable defendants who otherwise would not be liable.
As a general matter, conspiracy to commit and aiding and abetting a tort may
give rise to liability. 7 Where actionable, the elements for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty are as follows: "(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship,
24. See, e.g., Kittay v. Flutie N.Y. Corp. (In re Flutie N.Y. Corp.), 310 B.R. 31, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)
("A court will find that breach of fiduciary duty is properly alleged when the Debtor was insolvent or rendered
insolvent by a fraudulent transfer or was operating in the vicinity of insolvency at the time of or immediately
after the transfer."); Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 580-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (applying Texas and Delaware
law to deny summary judgment on claims asserting corporate opportunity doctrine violations in a corporation
allegedly in the vicinity of insolvency); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57
(Del. Ch. 2004) (reviewing critically arguments that there should be an affirmatively enforceable duty qualita-
tively different from that during solvency and stating, "I doubt the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to second-
guess good-faith director conduct in the so-called zone.").
Somewhat ironically, the court in Production Resources, in discussing the issue, impugned, apparently as
counterfactual, "extreme hypotheticals involving directors putting cash in slot machines." Id. There is, however,
authority involving this kind of activity. Dwyer v. Jones (In re Tri-State Paving, Inc.), 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1982) involved officers who withdrew all the funds the debtor had in its bank account and gambled it all in Las
Vegas "to win enough money... to pay the corporate-debtor's creditors." Id. at 3. The strategy failed. See id. at
4-5. Of course, it is unlikely that a reported case would involve managers who successfully adopted such a
strategy. Yet, such a strategy may be beneficial for creditors. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corpo-
rate Insolvency Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 n.19 (1993) (reporting
that the founder of Federal Express successfully adopted such a strategy during a period of financial difficulty).
25. See Barondes, supra note 1, at 69-71.
26. There is no intent to provide an exhaustive catalogue of differences, which could include different
statutes of limitations, see generally Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (two-year statute of
limitations for breach of fiduciary duty tolled when "a corporation's board is composed of alleged wrongdo-
ers") (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Acton, 49 F.3d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1995)).
27. The following discussion of the distinction between conspiracy to commit a tort and aiding and abet-
ting a tort is provided in F.D.I.C. v. Romaniello, No. CV 92-0294248, 1992 WL 369557, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1992):
In Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, the court traces the development of the liability of a
secondary defendant for the tortious conduct of a primary wrongdoer. The court focuses on two
variations of the theory of vicarious liability, ". . . (1) conspiracy, or concerted action by agreement,
and (2) aiding and abetting, or concerted action by substantial assistance." Id. at 477. It finds that
these "bases of liability correspond to the first two subsections in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 876 (1979) .... " It quotes that section on "Persons Acting in Concert" as follows:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him ...
or
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(2) a breach of the fiduciary's duty and (3) a knowing participation in that breach
by the defendants who are not fiduciaries." 2' Although historically there was some
curious authority in the Seventh Circuit, 29 currently a number of jurisdictions hold
that one may be liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty? On the
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself ....
The first of these the court designates "conspiracy;" the latter, "aiding-abetting." The court finds
that "[TIhe prime distinction between civil conspiracies and aiding-abetting is that a conspiracy in-
volves an agreement to participate in a wrongful activity. Aiding-abetting focuses on whether a de-
fendant knowingly gave 'substantial assistance' to someone who performed wrongful conduct, not on
whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct." The court continues, "[Tlhere is a
qualitative difference between proving an agreement to participate in a tortious line of conduct, and
proving knowing action that substantially aids tortious conduct." Id. at 478.
28. Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., Inc., 519 A.2d 116, 131 (Del. Ch. 1986) (citing Gilbert v. El Paso
Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1984), affd, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990)). Proof of damage is also required.
See Gilbert, 490 A.2d at 1057.
29.. The court in Koutsoubos v. Casanave stated, "Illinois has never recognized the tort of aiding and abet-
ting a breach of a fiduciary duty." 816 F. Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (quoting Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman &
Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1982) ("There is no tort of aiding and abetting under Illinois law or, so far
as we know, the law of any other state.")). Assorted authority recognizing aiding and abetting predating Cenco
includes, Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) (stating the test quoted supra text
accompanying note 28, other than the last four words thereof, and stating, "The directors of a corporation
stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation's shareholders. And one who knowingly joins with any
fiduciary, including corporate officials, in a breach of his obligation is liable to the beneficiaries of the trust
relationship") (citations omitted) and Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (firm's receiver breached
fiduciary duty by agreeing to be a joint venturer in the purchase of firm assets in a foreclosure sale, where the
court stated, "[Oithers who knowingly join a fiduciary in such an enterprise likewise become jointly and
severally liable with him for such profits"). See generally Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476, 485 (Ky. 1991) (citing eight cases preceding 1970 in eight different court systems as authority for a similar
proposition). See also Aluminum Mills Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc. (In re Aluminum Mills Corp.), 132 B.R.
869, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying the motion to dismiss claim against the lender who allegedly paid
$100,000 to a company owned by one defendant to induce defendant directors to breach their fiduciary duties
to the debtor by releasing claims against the lender and noting that, "[ujnder Illinois law, [a] third party's
inducement of, or knowing participation in, a breach of duty by an agent is a wrong against the principal that
may subject the third party to liability.") (quoting Corroon & Black of Ill., Inc. v. Magner, 494 N.E.2d 785, 790
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). Modern authority construing Illinois law includes Shapo v. Engle, No. 98C7909, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17966, at *60 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 1999) ("Although it seems that at one point Illinois did not
recognize a tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, it appears that such a claim is now viable.")
and Technic Eng'g, Ltd. v. Basic Envirotech, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (N.D. I1l. 1999) (stating, in connec-
tion with a claim that officers of an insolvent closely held corporation breached a fiduciary duty to a creditor
and were assisted by a family member who allegedly was not an officer, that Illinois law recognizes liability"for
inducement or participation in breaches of fiduciary duties.").
30. See Smith v. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1193, 1198-1201 (D. Ariz. 2001) (denying
motion to dismiss claims against an accounting firm as allegedly either a primary violator or an aider and
abettor of a breach of fiduciary duty in, inter alia, communications with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion); id. at 1206 (denying underwriter's motion to dismiss claims alleging aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary); id. at 1208-09 (same as to outside general counsel); Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp. 2d 351,
357-58 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (denying outside counsel's motion to dismiss claims of aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty; controlling stockholder used assets of closely held corporation for personal purposes, including
payment of legal fees owed defendant for matters not relating to that corporation); AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar,
757 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 n.2, 1379-80 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (denying a motion to dismiss claims against an individ-
ual the construction industry for allegedly aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duties owed to a savings
and loan and a subsidiary, stating, "[Tlhe majority of case law, including that in Florida, recognizes a cause of
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other hand, it appears that the current trend is to hold no separate civil liability
exists in comparable contexts against an aider and abettor of a fraudulent convey-
ance.' Nonetheless, aiding and abetting qualitatively more egregious misconduct
defrauding creditors, such as hiding assets, has resulted in criminal liability under
other principles 2 and participation in managerial malfeasance that is a tort, in
action for aiding and abetting common law .torts, such as breach of fiduciary duty."); Weinberger, 519 A.2d at
131 (granting motion to dismiss claims that acquiror in two-step acquisition by omitting information about
the target in a press release aided and abetted disclosure-based fiduciary duty breach by management of the
target); Gilbert, 490 A.2d at 1057 (stating, in discussing a tender offeror's alleged aiding and abetting of a
breach of fiduciary duty by the target's directors by virtue of the terms negotiated with the target that allegedly
preferred the directors individually, "It is well settled that a third party who knowingly participates in the
breach of a fiduciary's duty becomes liable to the beneficiaries of the trust relationship."); Joel v. Weber, 602
N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (denying law firm's motion to dismiss claims that it aided and abetted
a breach of fiduciary duty; breach involved diversion by entertainer's former management company of partner-
ship distributions due the entertainer; funds used to pay legal fees to the management company's outside
counsel (a defendant)). See generally Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 936 (Cal. 1966) (unfair
competition claim in connection with corporate president's breach of fiduciary duty benefiting competitor).
Compare Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., LLC, 537 S.E.2d 397, 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("Al-
though this court has never explicitly recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty, we have at least twice implicitly acknowledged that such claims are viable. We have explicitly 'acknowl-
edged an aiding and abetting cause of action in ... fraudulent conveyances.' ") (citations omitted), vacated, 534
U.S. 801 (2001), remanded to, 563 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (reaffirming the punitive damages award),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 977 (2003), with Munford v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604,
613 (11 th Cir. 1996) ("In this case, we decline to extend aider and abettor liability to breaches of fiduciary duty
concluding that Georgia courts would not recognize such a cause of action.").
31. Ernst & Young LLP v. Baker O'Neal Holdings, Inc., No. 1:03-CV-0132-DFH, 2004 WL 771230, at "14
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2004) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court ... recently joined the multitude of other courts in
holding that there is no accessory liability for fraudulent transfers under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act."); see also, e.g., Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1088 (1 1th Cir. 2004); Freeman v. First Union Nat'l
Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272, 1277 (Fla. 2004). But see, e.g., Munford, 98 F.3d at 613 (stating one party "notes that
Georgia courts have acknowledged an aiding and abetting cause of action in torts involving violence, the sale of
unregistered securities, breaches of covenants with employment contracts, and fraudulent conveyances"). See
generally William L. Siegel, Attorney Liability: Is This the New Twilight Zone?, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 13 (1996)
(discussing assorted theories of liability against lawyers assisting in asset protection, including aiding and
abetting).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Dolan, 120 F.3d 856, 863, 868-69 (8th Cit. 1997) (affirming lawyer's convic-
tion for conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 371 and concealing or aiding and abetting the
concealment of a bankrupt's assets, 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 2; defendant, inter alia, made false statements concerning
the debtor's assets); United States v. Webster, 125 F.3d 1024, 1027, 1034-36 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming suffi-
ciency of evidence for convicting lawyer under 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(1), 2(a), of aiding and abetting debtor's
fraudulent concealment of assets in bankruptcy proceeding; defendant formed a corporation to which the
assets of the debtor's business were conveyed and prepared worksheets form which debtor's schedule of assets
were created omitting the debtor's stock in the corporation); United States v. Brown, 943 F.2d 1246, 1250-52,
1256-57 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming sufficiency of evidence to sustain a lawyer's conviction for violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371 for conspiracy to defraud the United States, where a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant
"discussed [the debtor's] assets with [the debtor] and how to conceal them during the deposition" and "actively
participated in the conspiracy by failing to reveal the undisclosed assets to the bankruptcy trustee" and by
destroying records; reversing the conviction, however on another basis); id. at 1253 (affirming sufficiency of
conviction for mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341, arising from false communication to trustee); United States v.
Connery, 867 F.2d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 1989) (reversing trial court's granting of judgment of acquittal in favor of
a lawyer as to aiding and abetting the filing of a false bankruptcy claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 2, on basis that
trial court erred in finding that "[a]t best, the Government introduced evidence that shows that [the defendant]
aided in the filing of a proof of claim which he knew was subject to dispute by the debtor and other creditors")
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addition to a breach of fiduciary duty, has resulted in third-party liability under
principles of civil conspiracy." This distinction is significant because the existence
of affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duties can materially increase the potential
liability of third-party professionals such as accountants, investment bankers and
lawyers.34 Indemnification is unlikely to mitigate the potential liability materially
because this kind of claim would be most typically brought against a professional
upon the insolvency of the client-the party who might naturally provide an
indemnification.
In sum, the existence of a fiduciary duty owed directly to creditors expands the
scope of creditors' claims by enhancing the potential liability of those who aid and
abet a fraudulent conveyance because aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty is actionable, whereas aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer is not.
This is not, however, the sole incremental increase in liability that would arise
were there to be a fiduciary duty owed directly to creditors of distressed firms. Such
a duty could be used to correct a second anomalous outcome-one involving mat-
(quoting the trial court); United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 831-32, 840-42 (1st Cir. 1981) (reversing
conviction for aiding and abetting, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 2, in connection with a "bust out" scheme involv-
ing ordering goods intending not to pay and to declare bankruptcy, finding the defendants purchased goods
the seller had not included in the "bust out" scheme).
33. The actions that have been the objects of civil conspiracy and that have given rise to liability to co-
conspirator professionals not arising from a breach of fiduciary duty, have been qualitatively more egregious
than the actions that might give rise to aiding and abetting for breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, lawyers knowing
actions in seeking to hide assets or engaging in sham transactions to prevent collection on a judgment have
given rise to civil liability. See, e.g., McElhanon v. Hing, 728 P.2d 256, 265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (considering
sham consideration for transfer of stock in lawsuit in which a lawyer was a defendant; one stockholder con-
veyed his interest to another after becoming aware of a verdict against the conveying stockholder by a third
stockholder), vacated in part on other grounds, 728 P.2d 273 (Ariz. 1986). Other authority addresses claims by
judgment creditors or those whose pending claims have given rise to attempts to secrete assets. E.g., Hadar
Leasing Int'l. Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. (In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co.), 53 B.R. 963, 981
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (affirming liability against lessor for conspiracy involving backdating leases for purposes of
limiting recovery of lessee's secured creditor); Dalton v. Meister, 239 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Wis. 1976) (actions in
anticipation of trial designed to "liquidate and secrete" assets that could be realized subsequent to judgment).
Aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty can create liability in less egregious cases, i.e., circumstances
where the complaining creditor is not a judgment creditor or does not have a pending claim. A collection of
pertinent authority is provided in Milton Roberts, Annotation, Right of Creditor to Recover Damages for Con-
spiracy to Defraud Him of Claim, 11 A.L.R. 4th 345 (1982 & Supp. 2005).
One of the more aggressive applications of civil conspiracy to bring a claim against a third party profes-
sional is provided by Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), where the court
found there was sufficient evidence to support a lawyer's civil liability for having conspired to participate in
wrongfully compelling the payment of $400,000. Id. at 473. The case involved a deed recorded by mistake; one
party, with the advice of counsel, postponed correcting the deed and sought to use the mistake as bargaining
power to settle breach of contract disputes for a favorable payment of $400,000. Although the attempt to coerce
payment of $400,000 was unsuccessful, the court found an adequate basis for liability that the wrongful action
harmed the victim on account of consequential construction delays, id. at 474, and found that there was an
adequate basis for punitive damages of $400,000. Id. at 475-76. See supra note 27 and accompanying text
(discussing civil conspiracy).
34. See, e.g., Smith, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1192, 1205-09 (accounting firm, underwriter, and general counsel);
Adena, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d at 357-58 (outside counsel); Joel, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 384 (outside counsel).
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ters of agency law, specifically, the in pari delicto defense and the Wagoner rule.5
Following Wagoner, courts have applied the in pari delicto principle to prevent a
trustee's assertion of claims against a third-party professional who participated
with the debtor's former management in fraudulent conduct. Hirsch v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co., for example, applies the principle to prevent a trustee's assertion of
claims against an accounting firm that allegedly participated in the debtor's Ponzi
scheme "because of the [d]ebtors' collaboration with the defendants[ I in promul-
gating and promoting the... Ponzi schemes."36 These principles have been applied
to Delaware corporations. 37 Thus, unless there is a basis for a direct claim by the
creditors, there would not be a remedy, which would essentially prevent parties in
some contexts from engaging third-party gatekeepers under contracts providing
practicable remedies for breach. If there is a fiduciary duty owed directly to credi-
tors of distressed corporations, aiding and abetting a fiduciary duty would provide
such a claim.
That is not to say that this claim would be a perfect solution. The claim would
depend on the malfeasance occurring when the corporation was distressed. It also
is not being argued that this theory of liability is superior to reversal of the Wagoner
rule. Two more limited points are being made here. First, whether there is a direct
duty can influence the outcome of litigated cases in a material way. Second, this
theory provides a basis under which courts can reverse outcomes under the Wag-
oner rule without having to overrule directly Wagoner and its progeny.
35. See generally Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1991). The proper
way for ordinary agency law principles to treat imputation of knowledge in this type of circumstance produced
changes between drafts of Restatement (Third) of Agency. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law
Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1215-21 (2003) (discussing
an illustration in RESTATEMENT (THIRo) OF AGENCY § 5.04 at 123, flus. 3 (Tenative Draft Nov. 3, 2002), con-
cerning imputation of knowledge of an officer to a corporation in connection with malpractice claims against
auditor).
36. 72 F.3d 1085, 1094 (2d Cir. 1995). See Mediators, Inc. v. Manney (In re Mediators, Inc.), 105 F.3d 822,
825 (2d Cir. 1997); Smith, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (citing In re Stat-Tech, Secs. Litig., 905 F. Supp. 1416, 1422
(D. Colo. 1995)) (stating, inter alia, in connection with not applying the Wagoner rule, "Where, as is alleged
here, the Complaint alleges a far-reaching scheme to continue a company in business past its point of insol-
vency and systematically looting it, it cannot be said that such conduct benefitted the corporation."); Wieboldt
Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 507-08 (N.D. I11. 1988) (debtor-in-possession permitted to maintain
claims against former Board of Directors for breach of fiduciary duty, distinguishing Bangor Punta Operations,
Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), on the basis that the claims were being asserted
on behalf of unsecured creditors).
37. Official Comm. of the Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d
147, 152, 161-66 (2d Cir. 2003) (referencing Texas law where debtor was a Delaware corporation); Wechsler v.
Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 44 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying New York law in
connection with claims alleging malpractice by a New York law firm by a trustee for a Delaware corporation
having a principal place of business in New York). See generally In re Danish, Exchange Act Release No. 39931,
1998 SEC LEXIS 800, at *2 (Apr. 30, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/343993l.txt (iden-
tifying the debtor in Wechsler as a Delaware corporation).
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A second distinction would be the type of remedy. An aider and abettor of a
breach of fiduciary duty is liable for compensatory damages.38 A jurisdiction might
also allow punitive damages." On the other hand, liability for a fraudulent transfer
typically results in a rescission of the transaction in question. A recent Seventh
Circuit opinion states:
[W]e are aware of no reported cases in which monetary damages were awarded
under the IUFTA, and courts such as Robinson have held under their state
version of the UFTA that monetary damage awards are only appropriate where
reconveyance of the fraudulently transferred property is impossible or where the
subject property has depreciated in value. Policy considerations would support
such a rule, as it would avoid speculation as to the value of conveyed assets.4"
The former remedy could be significantly larger.
38. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 486 (Ky. 1991) (stating, in connection with
two third parties who formed a partnership to finance a venture to be run by a corporate fiduciary allegedly in
violation of proscriptions against competing against one's principal, "[O ] ne who knowingly aids, abets, or joins
a fiduciary in the breach of his duty in order to make a profit becomes jointly liable with the fiduciary for such
profits. It can be inferred that both [of two defendants'] corporations are, in a sense, their alter egos and are the
instrumentalities through which these parties profited, all to the detriment of the [victim corporation], and the
benefits which accrued to the individuals now take on the form of corporate assets."); Whitney v. Citibank,
N.A., 782 F.2d 1106, 1117-20 (2d Cir. 1986) (examining aiding and abetting liability of commercial bank that,
to obtain a deed in lieu of foreclosure from its debtor, a limited partnership having a general partner as sole
limited partner, paid $200,000 to two of three partners for their consent; and affirming the award to the third
partner of that $200,000 (less legal expenses) plus an additional $236,677 in compensatory damages, represent-
ing a somewhat complex estimate, and $1.5 million in punitive damages).
39. Whitney, 782 F.2d at 1117-20 (2d Cir. 1986); Roth v. Mims, 298 B.R. 272, 292-300 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(noting compensatory damages including consequential damages are available for breaches of a fiduciary duty,
affirming award of compensatory damages equal to the difference between an estimate of the debtor's value
($2,049,000) and the value received ($262,500), and $1 million in punitive damages, noting the bankruptcy
court found, in a matter not part of the appeal, that the buyer of the debtor's assets was jointly and severally
liable for the compensatory and punitive damages under an aiding and abetting theory); cf Holmes v. Lerner,
88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (business consultant to general partnership found liable to other
partner for conspiracy and aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty; awarding compensatory
damages for loss of partnership interest; jury also awarded punitive damages); Time Warner Entm't. Co. v. Six
Flags Over Ga., LLC, 537 S.E.2d 397, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming an award of punitive damages against
a general partner (and persons controlling the general partner) of a limited partnership for breach of its
fiduciary duty to limited partners in the management of the partnership), vacated, 534 U.S. 801 (2001), re-
manded to, 563 S.E. 2d 178 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (determining the extent of punitive damages), cert. denied, 538
U.S. 977 (2003).
40. DFS Secured Healthcare Receivables Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, Inc., 384 F.3d 338, 354, 355 (7th
Cir. 2004), certified question accepted by DFS Secured Health Care Receivables Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes,
Inc., No. 94S00-0410-CQ-447, 2004 Ind. LEXIS 895, at *1 (Ind. Oct. 13, 2004) (identifying one of three certi-
fied questions as, "Is an award of monetary damages under the IUFTA available only where reconveyance of the
fraudulently transferred property is impossible or where the subject property has depreciated in value?"); ac-
cord Forum Ins. Co. v. Devere Ltd., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("UFTA allows only equitable
remedies such as avoidance, attachment, an injunction, or appointment of a receiver. Upon finding an UFTA
violation, the court may cancel the transfer or impose a lien against the transferred property, but it may not
award damages .... A conspiracy claim does not expand the remedies afforded by UFTA.").
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2. The Different Scope Will Influence Market Outcomes
Now that distinctions regarding who is potentially liable and the nature of the
remedy have been identified, the question arises whether the distinctions are mean-
ingful. A brief assessment reveals that the increased scope of liability can influence
incentives, which would alter market outcomes and therefore be significant. Before
confirming that the distinctions can make a difference, it bears mentioning that it
is easier to identify that the distinctions can influence market outcomes than to
assess whether the increased scope of the potentially liable parties is desirable.
Consider whether creditors should be able to recover consequential damages
against an aider and abettor of a distressed corporation's transaction that did not
promote the creditors' interests. Allowing the claim provides compensation for
harm actually incurred. As an initial matter before considering market reaction to
the legal rule, if consequential damages cannot be recovered by creditors, some
adverse consequences of distressed corporations' actions will be externalized. Of
course, the initial allocation of cost will affect market prices. If the costs are allo-
cated to creditors, creditors will charge more for extending credit. If the costs are
allocated to professionals who advise distressed corporations, those costs will be
reflected in prices charged to distressed corporations by the professionals.
In either case, the costs will be reflected in what corporations are charged, but
that does not mean that they will have the same effect. Even if the costs are passed
on to the same aggregate extent, the costs will not necessarily be ultimately im-
posed on debtor corporations in the same way. There will be a variation in the
impact on market prices if the parties on whom the law may initially impose the
costs vary in terms of their ability to discriminate among their customers along two
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act has a residual remedial provision allowing the award of "any other
relief the circumstances may require." UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7(a)(3)(iii). 7A U.L.A. 339 (1999).
Some authority construing this provision has been described as allowing "compensatory" damages, albeit in the
nature of tracing the proceeds of property instead of consequential damages. See, e.g., Profeta v. Lombardo, 600
N.E.2d 360, 361-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (allowing recovery of compensatory damages equal to the amount
realized on a subsequent sale of property fraudulently transferred). Other authority addresses the availability of
monetary relief for purposes of assessing the right to a jury trial on the issue, Hansard Constr. Corp. v. Rite Aid
of Florida, Inc., 783 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), or in other circumstances not referencing a
right to recover consequential damages. E.g., Morris v. Askeland Enters., Inc., 17 P.3d 830, 831-32 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding punitive damages unavailable under the UFTA under a principle that punitive damages are
not available in equitable actions, in connection with monetary award for fraudulent transfer of funds from
corporation to sole shareholder). Lastly, some authority awards monetary damage where the equitable remedy
is inadequate. Summers v. Hagen, 852 P.2d 1165, 1170 (Alaska 1993) (noting it was following the minority
rule, stating, in connection with a request for "expenses included interest on a loan from a 'high-risk loan
company,' attorneys' fees, damages for emotional distress and exemplary damages ... [ilf voiding the transfer
is inadequate, however, the plaintiff is entitled to damages equaling the lesser of the value of the property
fraudulently transferred or the amount of the debt. The value of the fraudulently transferred property should
be determined as of the time of the fraudulent transfer or when the creditor reduces the debt to judgment,
whichever occurs later. Because the underlying debt sounds in contract, not in tort, exemplary damages and
damages for emotional distress are not authorized. Interest and attorney fees are allowable to the extent author-
ized under Alaska Civil Rules 78(e) and 82. Additional awards for interest and attorney fees are not allowable,
as they would constitute double-dipping.").
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dimensions. The discrimination can be (i) in the form of identifying those debtors
likely to create costs imposed externally and (ii) in the form of varying pricing
among customers. It would appear that third-party professionals engaged by dis-
tressed firms would necessarily be better at the former. An investment bank assist-
ing in recapitalizing a distressed firm necessarily knows the firm is in distress. A
creditor extending long-term credit, on the other hand, may do so well in advance
of the financial distress. Allocating these costs to those who are providing assistance
at the time of distress is more likely to facilitate the first way, identified as (i),
above, to facilitate discrimination in pricing to more effectively allocate the costs to
those whose activities will result in malfeasance.
Allowing creditors to bring the claims against third party professionals also facil-
itates discrimination in pricing-allocating the costs of malfeasance to those who
engage in it-in the second way, identified as (ii), above. That is because of a
timing issue. Prices charged by creditors under terms negotiated long before dis-
tress are sunk. They, as sunk costs, won't influence whether a debtor engages in
malfeasance during distress." On the other hand, the costs of engaging a profes-
sional at the time of distress are not sunk costs as of the time the firm is deciding
how to proceed in distress. So higher fees passed-on by professionals who antici-
pate a greater risk of aiding and abetting liability can influence the debtor's deci-
sionmaking during distress.
In sum, for two different reasons, costs of malfeasance during distress are more
likely to be shifted to those who do not engage in malfeasance during distress if
creditors cannot bring aiding and abetting claims against professionals who aid and
abet debtors' malfeasance during distress. To put it another way, where creditors
cannot bring the aiding and abetting claims against these professionals, there will
be more distressed debtor malfeasance.
To be clear, this discussion does not conclude that liability should be imposed on
these third-party professionals. The only conclusion stated here is that it makes a
difference on which individuals or parties the duty is imposed. One can make a
plausible argument that liability should not be imposed on the third-party profes-
sionals. The potential liability imposed on a third-party professional found to have
aided and abetted an action resulting in an ultimate insolvency can be quite large.
Imposition of this liability may cause the best professionals to avoid doing business
with distressed firms.42 Large potential liabilities would create incentives for doing
this kind of work favoring professional firms, particularly thinly capitalized firms,
41. It is possible, of course, that covenants in credit agreements may have been adequately worded to
restrain this subsequent malfeasance. The point here is that the covenants are a blunt tool which are not as
good as the the opportunity to fully negotiate at the time of distress, as would the third party professional.
42. Cf Royce de R. Barondes et al., Underwriters' Counsel as Gatekeeper or Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis
of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 26,
on file with authors) (asserting potential liability may be a factor in a complex mechanism by which the level of
law firm compensation is set, accounting for a matching in reputation levels of clients and law firms).
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that could externalize the cost of a large judgment for aiding and abetting a breach
of fiduciary duty. It is not clear that it is ultimately desirable to create disincentives
for large, highly sophisticated professional firms to advise distressed firms. The
distressed firms may ultimately get worse advice. Of course, to reach a definitive
conclusion, one would also need to consider the extent to which all professionals
could segregate potential liability through, for example, incorporation of separate
entities.
Thus, the principal purpose of the discussion in this subpart is limited. It identi-
fies one context in which the affirmative enforceability of Credit Lyonnais duties
can alter the extent to which parties are granted a right to a remedy, in a way that
will influence market conduct. The issue is therefore not moot.
III. ANALOGOUS ISSUES CREATED BY PREFERRED STOCK
As a final preliminary matter of background, it should also be noted that issues of
directors dealing with conflicting constituencies are not unique to conflicts be-
tween creditors and stockholders in distressed corporations. Although this Article is
not the place to provide a comprehensive recounting of how legal principles of
corporate finance have regulated conflicts between holders of preferred stock and
common stock, it bears mention that these conflicts have been litigated in a variety
of contexts. Four types of contexts of these disputes are identified below, to provide
a sense of how courts have gone about resolving conflicts between holders of claims
having conflicting interests.
The first illustration involves antidilution provisions. Well-drafted antidilution
provisions typically provide that after an extraordinary event, convertible stock will
be convertible into whatever property the holder would have received in the ex-
traordinary event that the stock had been converted immediately before the event.43
Various circumstances, however, may cause holders of preferred stock to seek pro-
tections above those that have been bargained for by contract. Courts typically hold
that holders of preferred stock are limited to the express protection provided by
contract."
43. See, e.g., Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932, 938-39 (Del. 1979); Mariner LDC v. Stone
Container Corp., 729 A.2d 267, 274 (Del. Ch. 1998).
44. See Mariner LDC, 729 A.2d at 278-79 (stating, in construing antidilution rights, that the rights are
principally contractual and that preferences and limitations will not be implied) (citing Elliott Assocs., L.P. v.
Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998)). See generally HB Korenvaes lnvs. L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Civ.
A. No. 12922, 1993 WL 257422, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1993) (concluding antidilution provisions prohibited
dividend that would have resulted in a negative conversion price); DREXLER ET AL., supra note 20, § 15.13
("[W]here the matter for directorial action directly concerns the preferences or limitations affecting a class or
classes of preferred stock, the scope of the directors' obligation is contractual, and the rights of preferred
stockholders vis-A-vis the corporation will generally be measured strictly by the terms of the charter provisions
creating such preferences or limitations.").
It bears mention, however, that in connection with the allocation of consideration between holders of
preferred stock and holders of common stock, authority provides fiduciary duties may cabin discretion in
allocation of the consideration between the two constituencies. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d
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The second illustration involves the payment of dividends on preferred stock.
Preferred stock frequently provides that arrearages on dividends prevent payment
on junior stock, and that some level of continued arrearages will allow the holders
of the stock to elect a specified number of directors.4" Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp.46 involves a challenge to a board's failure to declare dividends on preferred
stock sufficient to eliminate the separate right of the preferred stockholders to elect
a portion of the board. The court describes the test as follows: "Before a court will
interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in refusing to declare dividends,
fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be shown. And this is true even if a fund
does exist from which dividends could legally be paid."47 In this case as well, then, a
court has in large measure left the decision to management, few circumstances
being triggered by the fraud or gross abuse standard. Burton v. Exxon Corp.4" in-
volves payment of dividends on a senior class of preferred stock, the entire class of
which was owned by the controlling shareholder, without payment of dividends on
a junior class.49 The court held the dividend must be judged under the intrinsic
fairness test." Applying the test, the court concluded the test had been met,"' re-
jecting the argument that the funds should have been retained and invested until
the firm had sufficient funds to pay dividends in arrears on all classes of preferred
stock.s2
A third illustration involves a corporation that changed its assets by conveying
some assets to a subsidiary whose stock was spun-off and by the acquisition from a
controlling stockholder of other assets, ultimately changing the nature of the is-
suer's assets.5 3 In dismissing the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, the court stated
that "[w] hen ... the corporate actions complained of are expressly contemplated by
584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986) (favorably commenting on plaintiffs allegation that holders of preferred stock are
entitled to a "fair" portion of merger consideration). See generally DREXLER ET AL., supra note 20, § 15.13.
45. Exchange listing requirements may impose this kind of obligation. See New York Stock Exchange,
Listed Company Manual § 313.00(C), available at http://www.nyse.com/lcm/l078416930972.html?enable=sec-
tion&snumber=3&snumber=313.00 ("Preferred stock, voting as a class, should have the right to elect a mini-
mum of two directors upon default of the equivalent of six quarterly dividends. The right to elect directors
should accrue regardless of whether defaulted dividends occurred in consecutive periods.").
46. 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975).
47. Id. at 659 (internal citations omitted). Elsewhere in the opinion the delegation to management seems
less clear: "[T]he contractual right to elect a majority of the board continues until the dividends can be made
current in keeping with proper corporate management, but that it must terminate once a fund becomes clearly
available to satisfy the arrearages and the preference board refuses to do so." Id. at 658.
48. 583 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
49. Id. at 415-20.
50. Id. at 416.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 419. The analysis includes an interesting turn of phrase: "It is true that stockholders are owners
of the corporation and expect to share in its profits. However, these expectations can be crushed. As investors,
the stockholders bear the risk that the company may not make profits in which they can share." Id. at 418
(citation omitted).
53. Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 835, 836 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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a certificate, the duties and obligations of the corporation and its preferred stock-
holders are governed exclusively by their contract." 4
A fourth context raising similar issues involves the allocation of consideration in
connection with an acquisition of an issuing firm. Delaware authority indicates
that holders of preferred stock have a right to a "fair" allocation of consideration
when the firm is being acquired in a merger. 5 In general, however, unless the
directors had improper personal reasons for seeking to allocate a greater portion of
the consideration to one class of stock, such as a material disproportionate interest
in that class, a claim alleging the directors breached a duty of loyalty in allocating
merger consideration will fail.56
In sum, as a general rule, in disputes between classes of claimants with opposing
interests, the courts have simply relegated resolution of the matter to the parties
themselves. This approach is desirable because there is a lack of rigorous and well-
defined principle (producing, as applied, a clear unique result) to guide an alterna-
tive approach.
IV. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SCOPE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
Part II identified a circumstance in which potential liabilities will be affected by
whether the principles of Credit Lyonnais result in an affirmatively enforceable fidu-
ciary duty. Further review of the doctrine is warranted.
A proper crafting of fiduciary duties requires consideration of the extent to
which such duties will affect the performance of distressed corporations. It is help-
ful as a preliminary matter to set forth a few principles that should guide the analy-
sis of the Credit Lyonnais duties. First, imposition of liability for failure to maximize
54. Id. at 845 (also denying motion to dismiss claims alleging violation of antidilution provisions of pre-
ferred stock).
55. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986). A cash-out merger would not
constitute a liquidation entitling the holder of preferred stock to any stated liquidation preference, unless there
is an express provision to that effect in the terms of the securities. See Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group
Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984).
56. In re General Motors Class H S'holders' Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 618 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing alterna-
tive bases for applying the business judgment rule-the absence of a material disproportionate interest in one
class of stock and stockholder vote approving the transaction). The court's discussion merits quotation:
Since the two stockholder groups had potentially divergent interests, plaintiffs believe that they state a
duty of loyalty claim merely by alleging that the Board treated one group unfairly---even if it was for
reasons unrelated to director self-interest. In my view, that is not the law. Rather, the plaintiffs must
plead facts from which one could infer disloyalty or bad faith on the part of GM's directors, in the
sense that the directors acted for reasons inimical to their fiduciary responsibilities. An allegation that
properly motivated directors, for no improper personal reason, advantaged one class of stockholders
over the other in apportioning transactional consideration does not state a claim for breach of the
duty of loyalty.
Id. Application of the entire fairness standard in reviewing allocation of merger consideration where the direc-
tors have significant interests that diverge from those of one class of stock is illustrated by Tele-Communica-
tions, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, No. Civ.A. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727, at *6-14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2006)
(denying defendants' motion for summary judgment).
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simultaneously the interests of two constituencies having different interests is not
defensible. Second, the governing principles should not facilitate self-dealing.
Third, legal rules should not force distressed firms into insolvency by preventing
activities necessary to allow ongoing operations to continue pending resolution of
distress, and should not materially impede desirable actions necessary for dis-
tressed firms to resolve financial distress.
Prior to reviewing these three principles, it is helpful to note that there are multi-
ple components to traditional fiduciary duties of directors, including how the di-
rectors consider the interests of the stockholders outside of distress. The duties
contemplated by Credit Lyonnais, however, are sui generis. In part, they are necessa-
rily so because they form a transition between two regimes-management of the
clearly solvent firm and management of the insolvent firm-that involve qualita-
tively different duties to the ultimate beneficiaries, the stockholders and the credi-
tors, respectively. For example, Delaware law has long permitted disparate
treatment of creditors by those managing an insolvent corporation.s7 On the other
hand, adverse disparate treatment of shares of the same class ordinarily would not
be permitted." Thus, in the transitional area, there must be differential treatment
of some of the duties that normally appertain for the benefit of the pertinent con-
stituency, the stockholders or the creditors. Some of the duties must disappear but
others simply shift.
These three principles do not have the same effect on all components of direc-
tors' customary fiduciary duties in solvent corporations. The principles may high-
light the desirability of restructuring some of the fiduciary duties, but not others,
when a corporation is in distress. Yet because these fiduciary duties are sui generis,
that variation in treatment is not inherently inappropriate.
57. Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180, 181 (Del. Ch. 1931) ("[Tjhe weight of authority favors the
view that as among creditors, no trust exists which prevents the directors of an insolvent corporation from
preferring some over others, notwithstanding the corporation is in failing circumstances and manifestly headed
for disaster.").
On a complementary level, exercise of creditors' rights against a distressed debtor by a creditor who is a
majority stockholder may not be burdened by a fiduciary duty flowing to the debtor. See Odyssey Partners, L.P.
v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 388, 406 & n.18 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating, as to actions by Fleming, the debtor's
majority stockholder and sole secured creditor, "Fleming is said to have breached its fiduciary duties by exercis-
ing defacto control over ABCO and a majority of its directors, in such a manner as to 'frustrate or foil' ABCO's
efforts to raise needed financing or capital, in order to protect Fleming's position as controlling share-
holder .... [Additionally,] Fleming acquired the shares by operation of law, as the high bidder at the statutory
foreclosure sale. In the circumstances, there is no precedent for applying a fiduciary duty analysis to the con-
duct of the January 9, 1996 foreclosure sale or the terms of Fleming's winning bid.").
58. See generally R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS &
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 5.6 (through 2002 supplement) ("The general rule within each class or within each
series (where the class is divided into series) is that voting rights of the stock may not be varied to discriminate
between shares of the same class or (where the class is divided into series) between shares of the same series.");
id. § 5.28 ("The directors may not discriminate among stockholders of the same class or series in the payment
of a dividend."). But see generally Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 121 n.2, 124 (Del. 1977)
(holding valid a charter provision providing one vote for each share up to fifty shares and one vote for every
twenty more shares and limiting an individual to no more than 25% of the outstanding voting power).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
ROYCE DE R. BARONDES
1. Multiple Principals
It has long been recognized that a fiduciary cannot simultaneously promote the
interests of principals having varying interests.5 9 There is not an obvious reason
liability should be imposed on a class of business participants for failing to perform
this impossible task. Financial distress cannot be eliminated by fiat, and because
distressed firms need managers, legal rules should not place on them duties that
cannot be complied with. This provides a justification for the outcomes discussed
above' ° where in contexts in which parties have negotiated contract provisions ad-
dressing extraordinary transactions, courts do not intrude into decision making
that involves "pie splitting" between preferred stockholders and common stock-
holders.6 It would appear to be sufficiently uncontroversial so that additional ex-
planation is unnecessary.
Reference to preferred stock also raises a second issue that further complicates a
determination of the proper principles. Even if one includes as constituents only
stockholders and creditors as creditors, resolution of the issues raised by Credit
Lyonnais can involve resolution of competing claims among multiple constituen-
cies, If the point is to have a corporation's directors promote the interests of the
then-current residual claimants, preferred stockholders may be appropriate constit-
uents. Preferred stock frequently will have a liquidation preference.62 Where the
corporation's net assets are positive but less than that aggregate liquidation prefer-
ence, preferred stockholders are the residual claimants.
Of course, a corporation may have multiple classes of preferred stock, having
varying relative liquidation preferences. Subordinated debt presents similar issues.
Where a corporation has negative net assets but can pay senior claims, the subordi-
nated creditors are residual claimants. 3 In sum, there may be a succession of classes
59. E.g., Gann v. Zettler, 60 S.E. 283, 283 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) ("It is recorded of Him 'who spake as never
man spoke' that, 'seeing the multitudes, he went up into a mountain, and when he was set his disciples came
unto him; and he opened his mouth and taught them; saying, ... 'No man can serve two masters; for either he
will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.' So, also, is our law.").
60. See supra Part Ill.
61. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing fiduciary duties in the context of allocation
of merger consideration).
62. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. EcoN. STUD. 281, 288-89 tbL2, 290-91 (2003) (providing
statistics for and discussing liquidation preferences).
63. When insolvency straddles the amount of debt subordinated, there can be the awkward circumstance
of multiple classes of residual claimants who are not pari passu (e.g., trade creditors to whom the subordinated
creditors were not subordinated). The trade creditors will not be effectively pari passu with subordinated credi-
tor, who abruptly become residual claimants when the ratio of the assets of the firm to its liabilities (a ratio less
than firms that are insolvent on a balance sheet basis) equals the ratio of the senior debt to the sum of the
senior and subordinated debt (as derived below). Trade creditors also will not be pari passu with senior credi-
tors whose percentage residual claim changes abruptly in that circumstance as well.
The derivation of the first proposition is as follows:
Define a as the ratio of the firm's assets to its liabilities, implying that Senior creditors will recover the
following, up to the amount of their senior claims:
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of residual claimants as a corporation becomes increasingly distressed. The exis-
tence of numerous tranches of potential residual claimants would militate against
some affirmatively enforceable duty shifting among constituents of distressed cor-
porations. 4 In those cases, as the number of tranches increases, the burden on
management to select the proper constituency increases. As discussed below,6" for
some types of fiduciary duties, however, this problem is more manageable than
others.
2. Facilitating Self-Dealing
A fundamental precept of developed analysis of business organization law is that
the separation of ownership from control creates incentives for suboptimal behav-
ior.66 The problem is particularly acute because the judicial system is not well
crafted to identify some of this suboptimal behavior. An examination of the devel-
opment of the Credit Lyonnais duties should consider the extent to which the prin-
ciples produce legal rules that make it more difficult for undesirable self-dealing to
be identified, and give rise to liability, in judicial proceedings.
3. Operation of Distressed Firms and Resolution of Distress
One focus of the principles governing management of a distressed firm should be
maximization of aggregate distressed firm value. That is not to say distributional
concerns-how the principles will influence allocation of value among different
classes of claimants-are necessarily irrelevant. The focus, however, should be on
whether developing legal principles will impede actions that are collectively desira-
ble. In particular, the developing notions of duties in distressed corporations need
to be examined from the perspective of whether they will materially impede the
ongoing, ordinary operation of distressed corporations67 and whether they will in-
hibit the formulation, adoption, or implementation of desirable attempts to resolve
the distress outside the ordinary course.
senior debt + subordinate debt
a liabilities
senior debt + subordinated debt + other debt
For senior creditors to recover in full, the above amount equals senior debt, which occurs when:
senior debt
senior debt + subordinated debt
64. See generally Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997) (denying holders
of preferred stock equitable relief seeking to enjoin a transaction to fund further operations where the corpora-
tion had a net worth less than the aggregate liquidation preference of the preferred stock).
65. See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure obligations).
66. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 7
(1932) ("The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit
the use of power disappear.").
67. See generally Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 797 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discuss-
ing possible fraud liability for omissions in negotiations with creditors).
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The existence of affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duties to trade creditors and,
perhaps, some other creditors including employees raises issues that are qualita-
tively different from the implications of duties owed to shareholders. Continuing
operation of a distressed corporation typically will include ongoing contracting
with current creditors, such as the purchase of additional inventory and services on
trade credit and revision of existing employment relationships. A corporation's re-
lationships with its shareholders certainly can involve post-relationship contracting
(e.g., stock buybacks) and frequently does in connection with stock-buybacks trig-
gered by termination of employment.68 Nevertheless, the scope of the interactions
between a distressed corporation and its creditors can be expected to be qualita-
tively different in frequency from the transactions between a corporation and its
shareholders. This qualitative difference creates possible concerns with importing
into the regulation of distressed corporations, for the benefit of creditors, certain
components of the fiduciary duties that ordinarily apply to solvent corporations.
Two that may have a particularly significant effect on the ability of a distressed
corporation to continue operations or to resolve its distress are discussed below: a
fiduciary's disclosure obligations in transactions with the beneficiary of the fiduci-
ary duty69 and a fiduciary's obligation to assure fair pricing in those transactions.7"
V. IMPROPERLY FRAMING THE ISSUE AS MERELY A QUESTION OF
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES PROTECTED FROM JUDICIAL
REVIEW BY THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
One might argue that the duty initially formulated in Credit Lyonnais simply repre-
sents an increase in the scope of directors', and potentially officers',7" activity that,
by virtue of the business judgment rule, is not subject to judicial review. Under this
view, the business judgment principle has a number of components. First, it excul-
pates directors from liability to creditors for disinterested management decisions,
supplementing the limit on liability to the corporation generally applicable when
68. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1987) (examining a private
corporation's repurchase of stock from a retiring employee where the issuer had then-undisclosed ongoing
negotiations to be acquired); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1981) (examining
alleged breach of contract of employment entered into in connection with acquisition of plaintiff's former
employer in consideration of, inter alia, plaintiffs sale of stock in his former employer and release of options to
purchase additional shares).
69. See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
71. There appears to be curiously little case law directly addressing the extent to which officers benefit
from the business judgment rule. For example, in the preeminent treatise on the business judgment rule,
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OP CORPORATE DIRECTORS 98-99
(5th ed. 1998), the authors state that authority specifically addressing whether the duty applies to officers is
.sparse," and note only a handful of cases including some containing nondefinitive language, e.g., "'may' be
covered," "[u]nder the circumstances of this case," and "generally applies." A discussion of the merits of the
various positions is beyond the scope of this Article.
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the corporation is solvent. Second, it further restricts the ability of a court to enter-
tain challenges to some managerial decisions in distressed corporations.
One problem with this view is that the law of fiduciary duties applied to dis-
tressed corporations should be a comprehensive, internally consistent whole. In-
deed the purpose of this Article is to begin to develop some of the components of
that whole. The articulation of the issue Credit Lyonnais identifies also brings to
mind other contexts in which the fiduciary duties of distressed firms need to be
examined. Four of those contexts are discussed below:
(i) Which constituency of a distressed corporation may, by approving a transac-
tion in which management is interested, diminish the judicial scrutiny that would
otherwise apply;
(ii) The effect of distress on Revlon duties;
(iii) The effect of distress on the disclosure obligations of distressed corporations
to their creditors and other aspects of the negotiation between distressed corpora-
tions, including the implications of Malone v. Brincat," and
(iv) The effect of distress on the manner in which corporations consider corpo-
rate opportunities that insiders are interested in taking for themselves.
1. Traditional Formulation of the Business Judgment Rule
In discussing whether the refinement in directors' duties initiated by Credit Lyon-
nais can be viewed as simply a slight enlargement of the business judgment rule, it
is helpful to begin by identifying that rule and the principles underlying its adop-
tion. The fiduciary duties of directors, as cabined by the business judgment rule,
are best viewed as reflecting the scope of judicial competence. Lawyers acting in a
judicial capacity are not well suited to reviewing previously made business deci-
sions. Courts are, however, competent to assess the propriety of how the decision-
making process was constructed-whether appropriate information was gathered,
whether appropriate experts were consulted, and whether there were conflicts of
interest. Recognition of this limit on judicial competence is reflected in the business
judgment rule," which has been described as follows:
72. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
73. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980), quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("Judges are not business experts."); Solash v. Telex Corp., No. Civ.A 9518,
Civ.A. 9528, Civ.A. 9525, 1988 WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988) (stating, in introducing a discussion of
the business judgment rule, "Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills,
information and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts and because there is great social utility in encour-
aging the allocation of assets and the evaluation and assumption of economic risk by those with such skill and
information, courts have long been reluctant to second-guess such decisions when they appear to have been
made in good faith."); Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (referencing the ratio-
nale in extending the business judgment rule to nonprofit corporations); see Daniels v. Thomas, Dean &
Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990).
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The business judgment rule has been well formulated by Aronson and other
cases. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ("It is a presumption that in making
a business decision the directors ... acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
corporation."). Thus, directors' decisions will be respected by courts unless the
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act
in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business
purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the
failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.74
2. Fairness Review in Distressed Firms-Earn-Outs
i. De Facto Elimination of Fairness Review in Distressed Firms
Of course, the business judgment rule does not, as an initial matter, insulate deci-
sion-making that involves conflicts of interest. Under Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.75 and
its progeny, "[a] controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a
transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving its entire
fairness."76 Procedurally,
[t]he initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party who
stands on both sides of the transaction. However, an approval of the transac-
tion by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of mi-
nority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the
controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-
plaintiff.77
Alternatively, some Delaware authority indicates that where the disposition in-
volves an interested party transaction with one not considered controlling the cor-
poration, informed approval in good faith by a majority of disinterested
stockholders subjects the transaction to review under the business judgment rule.7"
74. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).
75. 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
76. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994). Where an acquisition is formu-
lated as a tender offer followed by a short-form squeeze-out merger, however, the transaction is subject to a less
intrusive standard of review. See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. 2001); Solo-
mon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 1996); In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421,
435 (Del. Ch. 2002).
77. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (citation omitted). See generally In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders
Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *31 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (burden of proof not shifted by
approval by special committee and minority stockholders where company disclosed some projections but failed
to disclose more recent projections).
78. In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203-04 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("Even if the
ratified transaction does not involve a controlling stockholder, the result would not be to extinguish a duty of
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The question arises of how a court will interpret these judicially crafted provi-
sions in the context of a distressed corporation." What constituency's approval, if
any, would be sufficient to shift the burden to those challenging the transaction? A
combination of constituencies voting collectively would be problematic. There is
not a clear mechanism for weighting various constituencies, and leaving the
weighting to management creates problems. One can expect constituencies to have
differing desires. Requiring separate votes of and approval by creditors and stock-
holders is likely not to result in both constituencies approving (to say nothing of
the more complex circumstance where there are separate classes of each). Because
management can play a key role in running a reorganized firm,"0 it does not seem
prudent to adopt a principle under which disinterested approval cannot be ob-
tained and the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction is kept on
managers.
If the constituency to be promoted is left to management to identify, which
would be one extension of the business judgment approach to understanding
Credit Lyonnais duties, management will have much greater flexibility to defend
inefficient self-dealing by carefully selecting a constituency or combination of con-
stituencies whose interests are allegedly being promoted. For example, any volun-
tary sale in which a class of creditors, the common stockholders, or a class of
preferred stock voluntarily participated might be sustainable, the voluntary partici-
pation of one of these classes suggesting, at least in some cases, that the particular
constituents approve, or will approve if required to vote separately81
In sum, the contours of fiduciary duties in distressed corporations need to be
formulated to address more than ex post creditor complaints concerning whether
the corporation was well managed. They also need to identify the constituency
whose approval of an interested-director or interested-controlling-shareholder
transaction can shift the burden of proof to those challenging the transaction.
A process allowing this kind of approval is needed to implement a system that
prevents conflict-of-interest transactions produced by improper self-dealing. One
would assume that the approval of the constituency whose interests the board is to
promote at that time would be required in order to shift the burden of proof. Were
the two not the same, the disinterested approval might frequently be withheld sim-
loyalty claim. In such cases the Supreme Court has held that the effect of shareholder ratification is to make
business judgment the applicable review standard and shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff stockholder.").
79. See generally Aluminum Mills Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc. (In re Aluminum Mills Corp.), 132 B.R.
869, 891 n.21 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating that shareholder ratification merely estops the shareholders and
"does not apply in the context of the liquidation of an insolvent company, for in such a case, it is the creditors
who will benefit from any recovery" (quoting In re Western World Funding, Inc., 52 B.R. 743, 772 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1985))).
80. See, e.g., LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282, 288 (D. Del. 2000) (controlling
stockholder proposing to invest $350 million in recapitalization of the debtor).
81. See generally In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at
*31 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) ("But no Delaware case has held that burden-shifting can be accomplished by a
tender of shares rather than by an actual vote.").
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ply because the potentially approving constituency sought more of the "pie." In
other words, the disapproval might be for reasons other than that the transaction
improperly represented managerial self-dealing.
If the selection of the constituency to be promoted in that context is simply
delegated to management, that choice is likely to remove from judicial oversight a
material percentage of transactions designed to resolve financial distress in which
management personally participates." That delegation could effectively eviscerate
the fairness obligations in conflict-of-interest transactions with distressed firms.
ii. Uncertainty in Structuring the Terms of Extraordinary Transactions-Earn-
outs
Under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc."5 and its progeny, "in a
sale of corporate control the responsibility of the directors is to get the highest
value reasonably attainable for the shareholders." 4 For a number of reasons, a final
period resolution of a distressed corporation is particularly likely to be found sub-
stantively objectionable to at least one constituency. It is well understood among
financial economists and legal scholars that leverage can create incentives for a
stylized corporation being managed on behalf of its stockholders to invest in nega-
tive return activities because the risk of failure can be disproportionately borne by
creditors."5 Famous footnote fifty-five of Credit Lyonnais6 reflects this principle.
The converse incentive can also exist in a distressed corporation being managed
for the benefit of its creditors. Creditors, who have capped claims, would not bene-
fit from the incremental value of strategies that increase a stylized firm's value over
the amount of the creditors' claims. Admittedly, this broad statement of principle is
somewhat incomplete. A creditor whose claims are not immediately due may bene-
fit from increased current value to the debtor. Such a creditor is ultimately con-
cerned about solvency when its claim becomes due and payable, and increases in
current solvency can make it more likely the debtor will be solvent when the credi-
82. See generally supra note 80.
83. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
84. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989).
85. See, e.g., Katherine H. Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory
Explanation, 37 J.L. & ECON. 157, 157 (1994) (shareholders' incentives to engage in excessive risk taking are
"particularly acute" when the firm is distressed); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency:
Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1486, 1488-91 (1993); George G. Triantis,
A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 912 (1993).
There also is a theoretical argument that an insolvent firm will in fact "underinvest" in projects, i.e., fail to
enter into transactions that would be profitable from the perspective of the firm as a whole, because of indiffer-
ence. This theory is based on the notion that shareholders will not invest new equity (or other efforts) needed
to permit implementation of a new project having a positive return, if the portion of the return to be realized
by shareholders will be inadequate, because the returns will be given to other stakeholders, i.e., creditors. See
WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 258-61 (5th ed. 1993);
Triantis, supra, at 911.
86. Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at '108-09 & n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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tor is to be paid. Nevertheless, just as the possibility that adverse outcomes will
disproportionately be borne by creditors can influence the incentives of a firm
managed for the benefit of its stockholders, the possibility that positive outcomes
will disproportionately benefit stockholders can alter the incentives of a distressed
firm managed for the benefit of creditors.
This concern is not simply theoretical. One basic issue in the structuring of a sale
of a firm is whether the purchase price will include deferred payments based on the
firm's post-sale performance, sometimes called "earn-outs."87 If the distressed firm
can negotiate a noncontingent sale price component at least equal to the aggregate
amount of the creditors' claims, a seller managed for the benefit of the creditors
alone will be indifferent to the amount of any additional contingent compensation.
This conclusion represents a context- specific application of the more general point
that has been previously made concerning the desire of creditors to "collapse [the]
probability distributions" of potential outcomes."s Of course, the shareholders, and
a hypothetical constituent seeking to maximize aggregate firm value, would not be
indifferent.
Use of contingent compensation can be important in allowing a seller to maxi-
mize the value it realizes. It can mitigate informational disadvantages a buyer has
that may otherwise yield lower purchase prices. Adoption of legal principles that
shift the incentives for using contingent compensation are therefore of potential
concern.
iii. Identifying a Principle for Resolving the Duties
Credit Lyonnais identifies an issue that, on reflection, cannot be summarily resolved
by simply asserting that when a corporation becomes distressed, directors are given
greater leeway to promote non-shareholder constituencies. Two possible theoretical
concerns have been noted in the context of extraordinary transactions designed to
resolve distress. First, that approach, delegating to management the authority to
decide which constituency to promote, would eviscerate fairness review as to many
distressed corporations; some class of participating constituents would consent.
Second, creditors and stockholders of distressed firms may have diametrically op-
87. Maier defines "earn-out" provisions as follows: "Sometimes a portion of the consideration payable to
the shareholders of the target company will be contingent on the future productivity of the target company or
(less commonly) on the productivity of the combined group as a whole." Thomas A. Maier, How Lawyers Use
Financial Information: Mergers, Acquisitions, Valuation and Other Transactions-and Their Impact on Reported
Financial Results, in BASICS OF ACCOUNTING & FINANCE: WHAT EVERY PRACTICING LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW,
at 351, 365 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 6560, 2005).
88. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On The Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 158 (1989).
A circumstance that might be considered analogous is presented in McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del.
2000). In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that minority shareholders had properly pleaded viola-
tions of fiduciary duties of directors in connection with the negotiation and approval of a sale of a majority-
owned subsidiary in connection with, inter alia, improper emphasis on the controlling stockholder's desire for
immediate receipt of cash. Id. at 921- 23.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
ROYCE DE R. BARONDES
posed views concerning the use of a customary compensation provision in the sale
of a business-an earn-out. Earn-outs can be beneficial in mitigating the adverse
consequences of information asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Elimination
of their use in the disposition of distressed corporations is therefore likely not to be
joint wealth maximizing. Promoting consideration of creditors' interests, however,
could require avoiding this structure.
These theoretical concerns are accompanied by post-Credit Lyonnais authority
examining the final period resolution of a distressed corporation. A few courts have
noted a tension between typical board fiduciary duties on the sale of a firm and the
altered fiduciary duties arising from distress or insolvency. 9 One court stated, "It is
commonplace to say that the directors of [the debtor] (due to its balance sheet
insolvency) owed a fiduciary duty to the Noteholders in considering the authoriza-
tion of the Merger. It is a more difficult proposition to apply that legal precept to
the facts presented in this case."'  As recently noted by the Delaware Court of
Chancery in Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.,9" the decision
in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.92 highlights that the issues identified in
Credit Lyonnais are problematic upon disposition of the firm. In Omnicare, the
court found to be an unlawful abdication of an insolvent corporation's directorial
authority entering into deal-protection provisions93 for a merger agreement de-
signed "to assure that the ... creditors were paid in full and that the ... stockhold-
ers received the highest value available for their stock." '94 Significantly, the opinion
references the minority stockholders, not the creditors of the insolvent corporation,
in identifying the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties whose interests had been inade-
quately protected by the directors.9"
Proceeding on the assumption that it is desirable to allow distress to be resolved
outside of bankruptcy proceedings, the need to allow review of managerial deci-
89. On the other hand, the court in Wiebolt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988),
rejected the argument of the former directors of an allegedly insolvent corporation that their Revlon duties
sanctioned their approval of an LBO. Id. at 510. The court held this rationale to be inapplicable because the sale
of the firm was not inevitable. Id. That approach could produce a curious outcome; if the sale became inevita-
ble by virtue of greater distress, the board then would not have to consider creditors' interests.
90. Angelo, Gordon & Co. v. Allied Riser Commc'ns Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 226, 228 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(examining a transaction that, in the view of the creditor's board, enhanced the likelihood of debt repayment).
91. 863 A.2d 772, 788 n.51 (Del. Ch. 2004) (referencing "a decision that arguably reflects a very different
perspective than Credit Lyonnais").
92. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
93. The agreement provided that the board would submit the plan to the stockholders for their approval
even if the board subsequently withdrew its recommendation of the transaction, id. at 933 (referencing Dela-
ware General Corporation Law § 251(c) (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2002), West, Westlaw DE-
STMANN02 database through 2002 Regular Sess.), amended by Corporations-General Amendments, 2003
Delaware Laws Ch. 84 (S.B. 127)), and omitted a fiduciary-out. Id. at 936. Approval was assured because stock
held by controlling stockholders, who were directors, was also irrevocably agreed to be voted in favor of the
transaction. Id.
94. Id. at 938.
95. Id. at 937.
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sion-making for purposes of decreasing self-dealing indicates that it will not be
efficient to allow managers to determine at the time of distress whose interest to
promote. The determination needs to be made ex ante so that there is a constitu-
ency that can bring an action monitoring management.
Characterizing the rights of potential constituents as options illuminates the is-
sue. Frequently, banks and other creditors that provide capital will have bargained
for certain express rights to participate in the management of a corporation. Some
of the more intrusive powers to influence management will be actuated when fi-
nancial distress triggers covenants allowing acceleration of indebtedness.96 The
point of these rights is to enable these creditors to monitor how the business is
being run and to have the ability to require that corrective action be taken while the
debtor is still capable of being rescued.
Making creditors the intended97 beneficiaries of fiduciary duties is different from
making stockholders the intended beneficiaries of the duties. Creditors will have
retained the ability to challenge actions the creditors wish the corporation to un-
dertake. Imposing a separate fiduciary duty owed to the creditors of these dis-
tressed firms gives creditors two sets of rights: Either the creditors can intervene,
using the expressly negotiated rights, or the creditors can choose not to intervene,
relying on the possibility that if things do not turn out well, they can bring a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty.
Consider a distressed firm contemplating two courses of action, A and B. The
distress, triggering covenants, may have enabled some creditors to influence the
choice. Assume the creditors desire choice A. If the corporation's management
chooses A, the creditors will not object, the course will be pursued, and the credi-
tors will have retained some ability to challenge the propriety of the action as a
breach of fiduciary duty. If the corporation's management chooses B, the creditors
will object and force the selection of choice A.
That does not mean management would be helpless in this circumstance. It
could seek express approval of any action, as part of seeking to estop the creditors
in any subsequent challenge. This would be similar to the approval of the fairness
of management conflict-of-interest transactions discussed above,9" but it would be
more burdensome because it would also apply to the wider array of transactions in
which management is disinterested. That process, if frequently invoked, would de-
viate from what one normally envisions as the efficient delegation of decision-
making to informed directors, and the officers they appoint.
96. See supra note 44.
97. Of course, some of these fiduciary duties cannot be directly enforced by shareholders, but can only be
enforced in a derivative capacity. Solely for purposes of ease of explication, much of the discussion in this
Article elides that distinction.
98. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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iv. Balancing Representation to Replicate Aggregate Wealth Maximization
Part of the customary fiduciary duty scheme seems well designed, perhaps inadver-
tently, to accommodate issues of distressed corporations. Under Paramount Com-
munications, Inc. v. Time, part of what is delegated to directors is the determination
of the time horizon considered by directors in managing a corporation." Selection
of the time horizon can be particularly important in allocating value between credi-
tors and equity holders in distressed corporations."° There may be a schizophrenic
quality to the management of a distressed corporation as a result. Unless manage-
ment seeks to promote the interests of creditors, managerial decision-making may
be subject to being overruled piecemeal as to activities implicating contractual ap-
proval requirements.
Yet keeping the issue of time horizon within the powers delegated to manage-
ment may give management sufficient flexibility to accommodate goals of maxi-
mizing aggregate wealth within the contours of their decision-making subject to
limited review by creditors having focused, contractually negotiated approval
rights. Because creditors will have express rights to intrude into decision-making
that are not accompanied by a comparable right in stockholders, creditors may
have relatively more ability to influence choices that have an impact on the time
horizon being pursued. It is possible that, where promotion of the interests of the
creditors may not reflect the time horizon in the best interests of all constituencies
collectively, having fiduciary duties owed to stockholders may be helpful in provid-
ing balance in management.
v. Conclusions as to Contours of Default Legal Rules
These concerns might be harmonized in the following conclusions. First, the appli-
cation of the business judgment rule should, if anything, be stronger, not weaker,
as to claims by creditors in connection with alleged breaches of duties of care.
When creditors have the ability to influence management decisions but neverthe-
less allow management to proceed in a particular way, those creditors should be, if
anything, more limited in their ability to challenge the activity ex post. Any other
outcome creates an option. The option is undesirable because, inter alia, it will be
difficult to price ex ante, suggesting that creditors will not pay for the option ex
ante. It is also problematic because it needlessly enhances potential personal liabil-
ity of directors, which is not desirable insofar as these individuals are risk-averse.
Thus, the trend toward applying the business judgment rule in claims by credi-
99. 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990) ("Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise
to the stockholders' duly elected board of representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise
includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to
the stockholders." (citation omitted)).
100. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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tors'°' and toward enforcing against creditors charter provisions limiting director
liability to creditors" 2 is desirable.
Second, determination of the appropriate time horizon for measuring firm strat-
egies should continue to be delegated to management notwithstanding distress. If
the obligation were to follow creditors' desires, the principle could drive managers
to ignore future profits not inuring to the benefit of creditors having capped
claims.
Third, the fiduciary duties to maximize firm value on the sale of a solvent but
distressed firm should continue to be owed to stockholders. In some distressed
firms, creditors will have bargained for express approval rights. Neither constitu-
ency's interests, however, will be directly aligned with the interests of the constitu-
encies as a whole. Requiring that directors seek to promote the interests of
stockholders creates a balance in which the competing interests can be resolved
through negotiation at which both creditors, having whatever express approval
rights they have negotiated, and equityholders are represented. Creating a model of
resolution of final-period problems based on bargaining between competing con-
stituencies is likely superior to requiring that directors simultaneously maximize
the returns to constituencies having competing interests.' 3 It also creates a single
constituency whose interests are to be promoted, which limits the ability of man-
agement to cloak self-dealing by purporting to represent a noncommon stock-
holder constituency. And it allows a single constituency to approve a conflict-of-
101. E.g., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (charter provision eliminating director liability
to the fullest extent permitted by law prevents assertion by trustee, whether brought on behalf of the corpora-
tion or on behalf of the creditors, seeking monetary damages against directors for breach of duty of care;
applying Delaware law), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2286 (2006); Angelo, Gordon & Co. v. Allied Riser Commc'ns
Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002) ("My preliminary view is that, even where the law recognizes that the
duties of directors encompass the interests of creditors, there is room for application of the business judgment
rule."); Continuing Creditors' Comm. of Star Telecomms., Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F.Supp. 2d 449, 462-63 (D.
Del. 2004); see Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (implicitly approving application of the
business judgment rule in claims of mismanagement of a distressed corporation); cf LaSalle Nat'l Bank v.
Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292 (D. Del. 2000) (discussing actions in implementing a recapitalization devel-
oped one month before a voluntary bankruptcy petition was filed, where the debtor's reorganization was not
approved by the bankruptcy court until one and one-half years later); cf. In re Rego Co., 623 A.2d 92, 109 n.35
(Del. Ch. 1992) (citing Devereux v. Berger, 284 A.2d 605 (Md. 1971) ("When directors of a dissolved Delaware
corporation are, during the course of winding up corporate affairs, required to make decisions affecting various
classes of interest holders, they are protected from liability in doing so, so long as they act disinterestedly, with
due care and in good faith.")); Comm. of Creditors of Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics Systems),
99 B.R. 870 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1989); see also Dennis J. Connolly & Wendy R. Reiss, Second Circuit Says Exculpa-
tion Provisions Apply to Trustee Claims Against Directors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2005, at 26; Growe v.
Bedard, No.Civ. 03-198-B-S, 2004 WL 2677216 (D. Me. Nov. 23, 2004); Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin
Retail Stores Inc.), No. 97C7934, 97C6043 2000 WL 28266 (N.D. 111. Jan. 12, 2000).
102. E.g., Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 798 (Del. Ch. 2004).
103. Cf C-T of Va., Inc. v. Barrett (In re C-T of Va., Inc.), 958 F.2d 606, 612 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating, in
rejecting one party's argument that consideration received by stockholders in the firm's acquisition in a reverse
triangular merger constituted a distribution subject to limits on corporate dividends, that it would impractica-
ble for directors to fulfill Revlon duties in maximizing sales price in an acquisition structured as a merger if the
directors also had to consider whether the acquirer would remain solvent following the sale).
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interest transaction, shifting the burden of proof as to fairness, retaining the ability
of some independent group (the stockholders) to act as a check on managerial self-
dealing.
vi. Waiver
A final question is the extent to which these duties should be waivable. At the
moment, only tentative observations, not firm conclusions, have been developed.
Although at the moment empirical evidence is not being supplied to support the
proposition, one might hypothesize that it is particularly important to focus on
restraining self-dealing when assessing whether these duties can be revised by
agreement, a charter provision, or the like. It has been noted by others that one of
the advantages of property rules is that they create uniform sets of rights. The point
is that, in some contexts, they allow efficient abstraction-the rights are the rights,
and one need not separately investigate the scope of rights that are the subject of
market transactions. A limited set of rights also facilitates comparison between pos-
sible investments in corporations.
This principle also has been applied to corporation law.1"4 If we have "corpora-
tions" that have different rules pertaining to how self-dealing in distress is con-
trolled, there will be additional costs in ascertaining the operative rules for
individual corporations. The expenditure would be beneficial to make on an indi-
vidual basis because, as distress approaches, those with greater knowledge will be
more likely to sell their ownership stakes to those who are less informed. That some
would benefit from these expenditures does not justify, however, creating a legal
scheme that makes the expenditures desirable on an individual basis. In the aggre-
gate, the expenditures represent the costs to assemble information that is only valu-
able by virtue of the pertinent legal rule. No one would have to make the
expenditures if legal rules did not allow for multiple possible relationships. At the
moment, no empirical evidence is being presented concerning the value from al-
lowing, for example, corporations to elect to have the burden of proof of fairness of
conflict-of-interest transactions shift on distress to approval by creditors. All that
can be said is that it is not clear that the aggregate value of allowing this would
exceed the aggregate cost arising from investigating whether particular corporations
had adopted such provisions." 5
104. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.I. 387 (2000).
105. There are also distributional concerns. Less-informed investors would be less likely to investigate, and
would therefore be more likely to be disadvantaged. The costs of allowing waiver would need to include precau-
tion costs expended by less-informed investors, e.g., in the hiring of investment advisers, any consequences of
disproportionate bearing of these costs on persons particularly more risk-averse than others and the possibility
that those with access to the information would use it as part of implicit commercial bribery to influence other
corporate decision-making (e.g., an investment firm providing the information in advance to "favored" cus-
tomers who may steer future business, in the same way that initial public offerings have been allocated in the
past).
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3. Fairness of Terms Negotiated with Creditors; Disclosure Obligations
Consideration of Credit Lyonnais raises the issue of how any duties owed to non-
shareholder constituencies will influence a distressed corporation's dealings with its
creditors. Typically, of course, a corporation's contracting with trade creditors is
the product of ordinary market transactions in which the corporation is not re-
quired to defer to the interests of the creditors. The traditional rule as to employ-
ment relationships is the same-in negotiating the terms of an employee's
compensation, the parties are not fiduciaries of each other."°
Somewhat anomalous in this regard is the application of federal insider trading
prohibitions on the sale of shares, which in market transactions could easily be to
persons who are not already shareholders.'0 7 Nevertheless, insider trading prohibi-
tions apply to a fiduciary's sales of shares on the basis of material nonpublic infor-
mation." 8 Thus, a full extension upon distress or insolvency of the fiduciary duties
owed to stockholders could appertain to each extension of credit in distress or in
insolvency. Of course, federal insider trading principles would not apply to many
extensions of credit, as they would not involve the sale of a security."°9 But, on a
similar theory, a court applying general state anti-fraud provisions, for example,
fraud provisions not limited to the purchase or sale of a security, could find fiduci-
ary obligations applying in a transaction creating the fiduciary relationship.
Of course, a determination that fiduciary obligations did not apply to a transac-
tion creating a fiduciary relationship would not dispose of the issue of the nature of
fiduciary obligations owed to creditors of distressed corporations. In the course of
normal operations, distressed corporations will contract with existing creditors,
and the issue of the scope of fiduciary duties appertaining to that contracting re-
quires resolution. Two types of duties are discussed below: First, a court could seek
to reform the process by which these contracts are negotiated by imposing disclo-
sure obligations that would not appertain in market transactions between indepen-
dent parties. Second, a court could impose a fairness obligation.
i. Disclosure
Particularly thorny consequences of classifying creditors as beneficiaries of fiduci-
ary duties of distressed corporations are raised by disclosure obligations of fiducia-
ries. There are two possible theories giving rise to altered disclosure obligations. In
some contexts, when a fiduciary contracts with the beneficiaries of the duties, the
fiduciary operates under heightened disclosure obligations, even as to transactions
106. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. e (1958) ("A person is not ordinarily subject
to a fiduciary duty in making terms as to compensation with a prospective principal.").
107. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980) (citing authority that references
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)--authority construing the not patently analogous section 16,
15 U.S.C. § 78 (2005)).
108. Id.
109. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
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that are not modifications of relationships that gave rise to the fiduciary obliga-
tion." ° Transactions between a corporation and its stockholders alleging breach of
fiduciary duty typically, however, involve transactions in the securities,"' which
raises substantial questions concerning whether other transactions, such as those
not involving the instrument creating the beneficiary relationship, would trigger
disclosure obligations. Malone v. Brincat,"2 however, suggests another basis for du-
ties concerning disclosure. In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
When the directors are not seeking shareholder action, but are deliberately mis-
informing shareholders about the business of the corporation, either directly or
by a public statement, there is a violation of fiduciary duty. That violation may
result in a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation or a cause of action for
damages. There may also be a basis for equitable relief to remedy the
violation. '3
The Brincat opinion at times seems to peg the duty to the fact that the stock-
holders elected the directors."' At other points, however, the opinion indicates
these duties "derive[ I from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty
and good faith."" 5
Conceptualizing creditors as beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations can signifi-
cantly affect how a distressed corporation is required to be run. Consider, for ex-
ample, subsequent purchases of goods or services on trade credit. Imposing a
fiduciary duty of candor to creditors would require greater disclosure of the corpo-
ration's financial position.
The effect would not be limited to trade creditors. A typical strategy to recapital-
ize a distressed firm involves repurchasing the corporation's outstanding debt at
reduced prices, perhaps as part of an exchange offer." 6 In the face of sparse author-
ity, there has been some disagreement in the literature concerning whether tradi-
tional norms-principles independent of Credit Lyonnais-impose disclosure
1l1t. See, e.g., Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Il. 1987) (indicating, in a context
reminiscent of a "one bite" rule, that a prior agency relationship in which a broker effected a transaction might
give rise to a fiduciary duty in connection with subsequent transactions).
111. See, e.g., Birbeck v. Am. Toll Bridge Co. of Cal., 2 A.2d 158, 165 (Del. Ch. 1938) (stockholders ex-
changed their stock for stock in a second, newly formed corporation in a transaction organized by officers of
the corporation; the court ordered cancelation, as a "secret" profit, of stock acquired by those officers in the
successor corporation disproportionate to their interests in the initial corporation).
112. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
113. Id. at 14 (internal citation omitted).
114. Id. at 10-11 ("Shareholders are entitled to rely upon the truthfulness of all information disseminated
to them by the directors they elect to manage the corporate enterprise.").
115. Id. at 11.
116. See, e.g., Allen L. Weingarten, Consensual Non-Bankruptcy Restructuring of Public Debt Securities, 23
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 159, 161 (1990).
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obligations on the corporation." 7 A disclosure obligation could materially influence
the outcome of attempted debt repurchases not accompanied by a simultaneous
exchange offer. A simultaneous exchange offer, on the other hand, could impose
candor obligations.8
Debt repurchases may be a single component of a multipart plan of recapitaliza-
tion. For example, additional equity may be contemplated. Plans for subsequent
equity infusions could well be material to bondholders deciding whether to accept
a repurchase offer. Application of fiduciary duties would clarify the pertinent legal
landscape, affecting the efficacy of debt repurchases in resolving distress. Whether a
corporation should be able to repurchase its debt without disclosing other material
plans is a complex subject, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this Article.
The point being made here is more limited: treating creditors as the beneficiaries of
a corporation's fiduciary duties will, as to distressed corporations, influence this
currently open issue. The decision is consequential in this context. Moreover, be-
cause a corporation's operations typically involve greater ongoing communication
between the firm and its creditors than between the firm and its stockholders-
communication that is much more voluminous-the disclosure obligation under
Brincat could be implicated in numerous communications with creditors. The re-
quired communications could accelerate exercise of creditors' remedies and limit
the corporation's options in resolving distress.
ii. Fair Terms
Fiduciary duties in some contexts require that any contract between the fiduciary
and the beneficiary of the duty be on fair terms. The precise contours of such a
duty to stockholders are, unfortunately, not entirely clear. For example, Loewen-
stein and Wang have recently noted:
On the more general question as to whether the corporation owes fiduciary
duties to an individual stockholder, the decided cases are surprisingly mixed.
Some courts hold, as a general proposition, that a corporation does owe a fidu-
ciary duty to an individual shareholder, although others conclude the opposite.
117. E.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., No. C875491SC, 1990 WL 260675 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1990)
(discussing insider trading claim asserted by holders of convertible bonds); 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, IN-
SIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 3:12, at 3-21 (2005) ("The approach more con-
sistent with Chiarella is that no abstain or disclose obligation arises in connection with trading in debt
securities, leaving liability in such a case to rest on the misappropriation theory .... "); Richard Hall, Recent
Developments in Duties of Disclosure and Candor, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE: BLUEPRINT FOR
GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE 199os, at 719, 727 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1053,
1998) ("It is not clear whether the requirement that an issuer not be trading in its own securities applies to
repurchases of debt securities or equity securities other than common stock. As the analytic basis for the
disclosure requirement under Rule lob-5 is the fiduciary duty owed to certain securityholders, the better view
seems to be that repurchases of debt securities and preferred stock (at least non-convertible preferred stock)
should not give rise to any disclosure requirement.") (footnote omitted).
118. See Weingarten, supra note 116, at 163-65.
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Possibly, in some jurisdictions, a company otherwise has no fiduciary duty to
an individual stockholder, but does breach a fiduciary duty to a shareholder
from whom it purchases stock without disclosing material, nonpublic informa-
tion. Obviously, from a doctrinal viewpoint, this is troubling. So, from the
initial question noted above, one is led quickly to the general question of the
corporate fiduciary duty to an individual stockholder and its implications." 9
Transactions in the securities themselves to which Cox and Hazen indicate
"[dlisclosure obligations clearly attach, ' ' 0 are perhaps most likely to give rise to
fairness obligations as well.'2' Because the contours of the actual duties to stock-
holders are different from other fiduciary duties'22 and are also not fully formu-
lated, however, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these incompletely
formulated fiduciary duties would be revised upon distress.'23
A final wrinkle involves principles governing close corporations. Some jurisdic-
tions, including Massachusetts'24 but excluding Delaware, 5 have in the past sought
to impose on stockholders of closely held corporations the norms of conduct typi-
cally applied to partners in a partnership.'26 Creative counsel might seek to assert in
a jurisdiction following this norm that, where a distressed corporation has a rela-
tively small number of creditors, the creditors benefit from, and are subject to,
fiduciary duties akin to those in partnerships.
119. Mark J. Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45,
48-49 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
120. 3 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS L. HAZEN, Cox & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 21.8, at 1282 n.13 (2d ed.
2003).
121. One potentially relevant case is Birbeck v. American Toll Bridge Co. of California, 2 A.2d 158 (Del. Ch.
1938), a case involving stockholders who exchanged their stock for stock in a second, newly formed corpora-
tion in a transaction organized by officers of the corporation. The court ordered cancelation, as a "secret"
profit, of stock acquired by those officers in the successor corporation disproportionate to their interests in the
initial corporation. Id. at 165.
122. An interesting adverse relationship between a controlling stockholder and the corporation was at issue
in Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 406 & n.18 (Del. Ch. 1999). The court indicated that a
controlling stockholders' acquisition of the assignment of a commercial loan made to the corporation is not
subject to fiduciary constraints.
123. One potentially analogous case is PPI Enterprises (U.S.), Inc. v. Del Monte Foods Co., No. 99 Civ.
3794(BSJ), 2000 WL 1425093, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000). In that case, the court stated that no fiduciary
duty owed was owed by corporation directly to holders of preferred stock who were selling the stock. The court
consequently dismissed an aiding and abetting claim against an investment bank.
124. See generally Lewenberg v. Del Regno, No. Civ.A. 1999-5681-C, 2001 WL 1517571, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. 24, 2001) (examining partnership-like duties in closely held corporation in connection with a stock-
holder's terminating employment and disclosure obligations concerning an associated stock repurchase).
125. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) ("[W]e
hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the
operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another.") (footnotes omitted).
126. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993) (rejecting an assertion that that "there should
be any special, judicially-created rules to 'protect' minority stockholders of closely-held Delaware corporations"
not incorporated under the close corporation provisions).
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iii. Principles Underlying a Potential Approach
One may hypothesize that it is relatively unusual for a sophisticated business entity,
in the course of negotiations, to seek expressly the right to lie to the other party.
That does not mean parties do not lie. Nor does it mean that they do not, in
negotiations, recast their desire to avoid liability for false or misleading statements
in more palatable terms. A seller of a business might, for example, assert that it is
providing all information that it knows but wants to avoid the transaction costs of
postsale squabbles.
A typical formulation of fraud liability, based on one provided by Prosser and
Keeton, is as follows: (i) a false representation, ordinarily of fact; (ii) the defen-
dant's knowledge the statement is false or that he does not have a sufficient basis to
make the representation; (iii) an intention to induce the plaintiff to act, or to re-
frain from acting in reliance; (iv) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (v)
damage.'27
Consider the nature of the relationship between a distressed corporate debtor
and financial creditors. A debtor might seek to make misleading statements that
would influence the creditor in deciding whether to exercise remedies available by
virtue of covenant defaults. 2 In this way, the relationship between the distressed
debtor and its trade creditors may be qualitatively different. The distressed debtor
may be engaged in ongoing transactions with its trade creditors involving exten-
sions of credit, and the pending transaction that may be influenced by a misstate-
ment may be patent. One potentially desirable component of an affirmative
fiduciary duty to creditors of distressed corporations, then, could be the imposition
of a duty, paralleling that formulated in Brincat, requiring communications be-
tween creditors and distressed debtors be accurate, regardless of whether a transac-
tion was pending.
127. This statement is a highly edited version of the elements stated in W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984); nothing original to the author of this Article
is stated, but the editing of the original is sufficiently extensive that the marks indicating alteration would
materially inhibit legibility. The original states in full:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this representation must
be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is false--or, what is
regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of information to make it. This element is
often given the technical name of "scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the
misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in taking action or
refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
128. The Brincat opinion in fact expressly notes that the plaintiffs allegedly did not sell and therefore did
not have a claim under federal securities law. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. 1998).
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This proposed principle of corporation law is designed to address management
of a corporation, not the general principles of rights creditors have against debt-
ors."' The proposed principle is that misstatements designed to influence whether
a creditor exercises contractually acquired rights to control a now-distressed debtor
should be actionable without proof that the debtor anticipated reliance. It is not
designed to address general principles of debtor-creditor law and statements made
to influence normal creditors' rights (e.g., repossession of collateral and initiation
of legal proceedings to collect on matured and unpaid obligations).
An affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duty in favor of creditors of distressed
corporations is being proposed here. That raises the question whether it can simul-
taneously coexist with a similar fiduciary duty for the benefit of the stockholders. It
is submitted that these two fiduciary duties can properly coexist, and that creating
this fiduciary duty does not, therefore, put directors in the untenable position of
having necessarily conflicting duties to two constituencies having different inter-
ests. In brief, the reason is that a duty to be candid with one constituency does not
impose a concomitant obligation not to be candid with other constituencies.
Even under general agency principles, an implied term of a contract engaging an
independent contractor is that the principal will not interfere in the independent
contractor's method of performance. 3 ' Thus, the Restatement illustrates:
P, a lawyer, employs A, another lawyer, to conduct a case in which P is the
defendant, A agreeing to follow P's instructions as to the manner of conducting
suit. Subsequently, P directs A to violate a proper but nonobligatory agreement
which A, with P's consent, had made with opposing counsel. A is under no
duty to obey this direction and is privileged to withdraw from the case if P
persists. 131
In sum, some level of discretion concerning the manner in which performance is
rendered is left in the agent. Directors, of course, are not agents of stockholders and
do not owe stockholders the duty of obedience owed by independent contractor
agents to their principals.'32 Thus, a conclusion that duties of candor are owed to
two classes of constituencies having potentially conflicting interests is not necessa-
rily inconsistent with traditional notions of the scope of the duties that would be
owed to a single constituency.
129. But cf. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.6, at 91-92 (1986) (identifying as principles that
should collectively produce a coherent body of law principles of veil piercing, fraudulent conveyance and equi-
table subordination). See generally C-T of Va., Inc. v. Barrett (In re C-T of Va., Inc.), 958 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.
1992) (noting the availability of fraudulent conveyance statutes as a means of addressing creditors' grievances
in discussing why corporation law restrictions on dividends did not restrict payment of consideration in a
reverse triangular merger).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 cmt. a (1958).
131. Id. § 385 illus. 2.
132. Id. § 14C & cmt. a.
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It may be that imposing duties of candor applicable to both equityholders and
creditors would produce results that, in the immediate term, are worse for equi-
tyholders than not imposing these obligations. In that way, one might view these
additional duties as inconsistent with the obligation owed to common stockhold-
ers. But if one views beneficiaries of fiduciary duties as not necessarily entitled to
demand lack of candor with third parties, there would appear to be more of a basis
for imposing on those managing a distressed corporation a duty to speak accu-
rately when speaking. To put it another way, Brincat imposes an affirmative duty of
candor in some contexts. But this is an asymmetric duty; it does not impose an
obligation to avoid candor with others.
VI. COMPETITION AND CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES
Weaver v. Kellogg'33 illuminates the interaction of fiduciary duties owed to other
constituencies with the corporate opportunity doctrine. These concerns are not
trivial, particularly in the case of smaller corporations.
Although the language of the opinion is not entirely clear on this point, Broz v.
Cellular Information. Systems, Inc. appears to indicate that a financial inability of a
corporation to take advantage of what otherwise would be a corporate opportunity
exculpates the fiduciary who takes advantage of the opportunity.'34 Although the
Broz opinion is not express on the point, this interpretation of Broz implies that the
Credit Lyonnais duties do not extend to corporate opportunities. The language in
Broz allowing a fiduciary contemplating an action that might constitute usurpation
of a corporate opportunity not to consider the possible consequences of a subse-
quent acquisition of the distressed firm135 is not inconsistent.
The A.L.I. principles, on the other hand, do not have this broad exculpation.'36
Following the A.L.I. approach in this circumstance creates difficulties if the Credit
Lyonnais duties are to extend to corporate opportunities. The problem is that insid-
ers are likely to inadvertently violate the pertinent requirements. The insider seek-
ing to take advantage of the opportunity would not necessarily have any reason to
know of the interests of creditors of the distressed corporation. Multiple creditors
might be interested in a particular opportunity, presenting questions of which
creditor should be offered the opportunity. There is not a simple mechanism in
place that would allow the creditors to vote-determining the number of votes for
each creditor, for example.
133. 216 B.R. 563, 580-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
134. 673 A.2d 148, 151, 155 (Del. 1996).
135. Id. at 156.
136. 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 5.05 n.8 (1994) ("Section 5.05 contemplates that whenever an opportunity, as defined in § 5.05(b), is
present, it is to be offered to the corporation, which may then determine whether the obstacles to accepting the
opportunity are insuperable or can be avoided. If the opportunity is never offered to the corporation, the
director or senior executive who takes the opportunity may not thereafter defend on the ground that there was
no opportunity because the corporation was unable to accept it.").
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Lastly, in the case of smaller distressed corporations, one can expect a significant
amount of informality in the way in which corporate opportunities are relin-
quished. In the course of trying to stay afloat, resources may be diverted away from
what may appear unimportant matters of legal housekeeping. If the informality can
be subsequently challenged by a trustee, or the creditors bringing a direct action,
the law will have created a potentially significant adverse consequence that can be
inadvertently created.
Weaver v. Kellogg"7 illustrates the problems. In that case, the court denied a mo-
tion for summary judgment on claims alleging breach of the corporate opportunity
doctrine. The corporation, which had only two shareholders (who, at the pertinent
times, also were the sole directors), loaned the shareholders money, which allegedly
was used to purchase other businesses. " 8 Notwithstanding the defendants' argu-
ment that the transactions were implicitly approved or ratified,'39 the court stated,
inter alia, "Defendants would not, in any case, have had the right to waive the rights
of [the corporation's] creditors."'4 ° The court ultimately concluded,
"The Court holds that Plaintiff may therefore prevail on his breach of corporate
duty claims if he shows, for each allegedly wrongful transaction, that [the cor-
porate debtor] was, at the time, in 'the vicinity of insolvency[;]' that the trans-
action led to [the corporate debtor's] insolvency; or that the transaction was a
fraudulent conveyance, as defined by the federal and state statutes.... ,,4
A concern with inadvertent failure to waive properly a corporate opportunity is
offset by concern that a corporate opportunity or other breach of a duty may be
waived in undesirable circumstances. Distress may cause stockholders, or those act-
ing on their behalf, to be indifferent. For example, the return to the corporation
from taking an opportunity may in some future states only benefit the creditors.
That indifference could result in stockholders waiving fiduciary obligations where
the waiver is not in the best interests of all constituencies. One might seek to treat
differently (i) direct competition with the distressed corporation and (ii) opportu-
nities coming to the insiders' attention solely by reason of his office with the corpo-
ration. Tests of corporate opportunities typically reference opportunities that in
fairness belong to the corporation. That does not really provide an actual test. A
better principle in the context of distress is as follows: If the corporation is insol-
vent, the creditors, with capped claims, would benefit. Their failure to have exer-
cised creditors' remedies, however, suggests that creditors should not be able to
challenge the activity ex post. If the corporation is distressed but solvent, creditors
137. 216 B.R. 563 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
138. Id. at 579-81.
139. Id. at 581.
140. Id. at 582.
141. Id. at 584 (quoting Credit Lyonnais) (citation omitted).
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are particularly disadvantaged only by actions that decrease corporate value but not
merely as much as acts that prevent the corporation from further increasing its
solvency. Where the corporation is distressed or insolvent, ratification of the taking
of the corporate opportunity by stockholders, which would shift the burden of
proof to one challenging the fairness to the corporation of the taking of the oppor-
tunity,142 provides a muted signal concerning fairness to the corporation. One may
therefore seek to distinguish between competition with the distressed corporation,
and opportunities in other geographic areas or in lines of business only related to
the distressed corporation's business. On this basis, one might find as actionable
by, or on behalf of, the creditors officers or directors improperly competing with
the corporation or improper, premature actions in preparing to compete. An illus-
tration is provided by Roth v. Mims,' in which during distress the president made
arrangements for sale of the distressed corporation's assets and employment with a
firm that would operate the assets.'
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This Article demonstrates that existence of an affirmatively enforceable duty under
the principles of Credit Lyonnais is not moot. The existence of aiding and abetting
liability for breach of fiduciary duty will give rise to a greater set of potentially
liable defendants and will increase the remedies otherwise available were the duties
contemplated by Credit Lyonnais not affirmatively enforceable (aiding and abetting
a fraudulent transfer typically not separately giving rise to liability).
Moreover, the issues raised by Credit Lyonnais highlight a basic problem that has
not yet been definitively addressed: which constituency's approval of a distressed
corporation's conflict-of-interest transactions will result in the application of the
business judgment rule. This Article argues that during distress short of bankruptcy
proceedings, fiduciary duties to maximize firm value on a sale should continue to
be owed to stockholders. Approval of conflict-of-interest transactions by disinter-
ested stockholders should continue to shift the burden of proof as to the fairness of
the transaction.
This Article also argues that the obligation of candor under Malone v. Brincat
should appertain to communications with creditors, thereby creating a duty not to
make affirmative misstatements, regardless of whether the communication is in
connection with approval of a particular action by the creditors. Financial creditors
will consider the information provided in connection with deciding whether to
exercise contractually negotiated control rights, and creditors should be entitled to
rely on truthfulness even if the debtor is not aware of a particular action the credi-
tor may take in reliance.
142. Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 520-21 (Del. Ch. 1978).
143. 298 B.R. 272, 277-78 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
144. id.
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That parties do not expressly bargain for these rights does not mean that provid-
ing them would be inefficient. The nature of the subject matter-one's ability to
lie-makes it difficult to address in contract formation. Parties may not raise the
issue in negotiations because doing so inhibits the trust necessary to enter into
voluntary contractual relationships. If it were not difficult to raise this issue, it
would be the subject of express bargaining, and at least some of the parties would
not avoid using the colloquial term "lie" where the typical formulations do not
invariably limit liability. Nevertheless, a search of the 866 asset purchase agree-
ments in the CORI contract database identified no contract in which the parties
included language addressing "lies."
Lastly, this Article argues in favor of the developing trend extending application
of the business judgment rule to alleged violations of duties of care during distress
by or on behalf of creditors, and to applying charter exculpation provisions to
eliminate that liability. In reaching this conclusion, this Article examines the extent
to which an alternative conclusion creates options in creditors that are difficult to
value and are therefore problematic.
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